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Ten years ago, the city of Chattanooga, Tennessee built its own
high-speed Internet network, and today Chattanooga's publicly
owned Internet infrastructure ("public broadband" or
"municipal broadband') is faster and more affordable than
almost anywhere else in the world. In this Article, I make the
case for why other communities currently underserved by
private broadband providers should consider building their
own high-speed broadband networks and treating Internet as
an essential public service akin to water or electricity, and I
explore means by which these communities can overcome the
legal and political hurdles they may face along the way.
J.D., Yale Law School. My deepest thanks for the guidance of professors
Alvin Klevorick, David Schleicher, and Gordon Silverstein; for the feedback
and encouragement of Olevia Boykin, Ariel Dobkin, Paul Henderson, Lina
Khan, and Theodore Rostow; for the editing of the Yale Journal of Law and
Technology, particularly editors Anderson Christie, Allison Douglis, and
Aislinn Klos; and for Mayor Andy Berke of Chattanooga, Tennessee, who
warmly answered a law student's cold e-mail and invited him to check out his
city. This Article is dedicated to my former students and coworkers at
Heights High School in Houston, Texas, who bring light to darkness, digital
and otherwise, and inspire this work. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION:
PUBLIC BROADBAND AND PUBLIC POWER
"Failure to provide broadband to rural areas of
America is a death sentence for those
communities. They cannot compete economically
without access to broadband."
-United States Senator Angus King
(I-ME)2
"We see broadband in the 21st century as
electricity was in the 20th."
-Danna Bailey (Vice President,
Chattanooga EPB)3
Internet can be delivered like other publicly funded
services, such as water, electricity, sewers, and roads. 4 To date,
Internet provision is left almost entirely to the private sector,
leaving many places without affordable or high-speed service.
However, there are a growing number of municipalities in the
United States who have built their own high-speed Internet
networks and offer it like a public utility. More cities should
join them.
Many communities currently underserved by Internet
providers-rural areas especially-were once underserved by
private electricity providers that offered electricity to big cities
and wealthy customers but left the rest of the country behind.
5
These communities formed locally owned electric utilities to
2 Mal Leary, Angus King, Senators Want Improved Rural Broadband, ME. PUB.
(July 13, 2016), http://mainepublic.org/post/angus-king-senators-want-
improved-rural-broadband [http://perma.ce/HHT5-N77K].
3 Henry Grabar, Republicans Are Coming Around to This Public Internet Idea,
SLATE (Sept. 1, 2016, 1:05 PM),
http:/www.slate.com/blogs/future tense/2016/09/01/public broadband is a b
ipartisan issue now.html [http://perma.cc/ML84-6XZA].
4 See Jeff Stricker, Note, Casting a Wider 'Net: How and Why State Laws
Restricting Municipal Broadband Networks Must Be Modified, 81 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 589, 614 (2013) ("The only unique feature of telecommunications
service provision by a government entity as compared to other government-
provided services (such as electricity, water, sewers, and roads) is that the
telecommunications industry is today predominantly administered by the
private sector." (footnote omitted)).
5 See D. Stan O'Loughlin, Preemption or Bust: Fear and Loathing in the Battle
over Broadband, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 479, 482-83 (2006) ("Beginning in the
1880s, electric power in the United States was provided primarily by large,
private electric companies ... private power companies did not consider rural
electrification to be economically feasible and focused their resources on the
more profitable urban market, leaving most of the country's smaller cities
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provide electricity at affordable rates and wider availability
than service from private providers. 6 Franklin Delano
Roosevelt made public power a central part of his successful
1932 Presidential campaign, 7 and once elected, he created the
Tennessee Valley Authority to bring affordable electricity to
rural areas.8 Today, more than two thousand communities in
the United States provide their own electricity, including cities
like Seattle, San Antonio, and Los Angeles. 9 All told, today
more than one in four Americans purchase electricity service
from a publicly owned power system or a nonprofit
cooperative, 10 and the rest purchase electricity from price-
regulated suppliers.
Like electricity in the last century, Americans increasingly
see universal, affordable access to broadband Internet as
urgent and important for local economies, education,
democracy, and good health. A recent study found that nine in
ten Americans believe at-home broadband is either "essential"
(49%) or "important" (41%), and only one in ten respondents
said it was neither.11 Another poll showed that two-thirds of
6 See David W. Penn, Competition, the Consumer, and Local Decision Making:
Public Power's Important Role, 10 ELECTRICITY J. 30, 31 (1997) ("Public power
utilities are a striking example of the institution of cities themselves-
citizens' decisions as to which services they choose to have their local
government provide.").
7 See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address in Portland, Oregon on
Public Utilities and the Development of Hydro-Electric Power (Sept. 21,
1932), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88390 [http://perma.cc/SU74-
7BYA] ("Electricity is no longer a luxury. It is a definite necessity. It lights
our homes, our places of work and our streets. It turns the wheels of most of
our transportation and our factories. In our homes it serves not only for light,
but it can become the willing servant of the family in countless ways. It can
relieve the drudgery of the housewife and lift the great burden off the
shoulders of the hardworking farmer. I say 'can become' because we are most
certainly backward in the use of electricity in our American homes and on our
farms .... What prevents our American people from taking full advantage of
this great economic and human agency? The answer is simple. It is not
because we lack undeveloped water power or unclaimed supplies of coal and
oil. The reason is that we cannot take advantage of our own possibilities. The
reason is frankly and definitely that many selfish interests in control of light
and power industries have not been sufficiently far-sighted to establish rates
low enough to encourage widespread public use.").
8 Adam Cohen, Roosevelt Understood the Power of a Public Option, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/opinion/OlTue4.html
[http://perma.cc/JAD8-3Z6T].
9 SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY
POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 258 (2013).
10 America's Electric Cooperatives: 2017 Fact Sheet, NATL RURAL ELEC. COOP.
AsS'N (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.electric.coop/electric-cooperative-fact-sheet
[http://perma.cc/3Z9Z-YZ7X].
11 See Kenneth Olmstead et al., Americans Have Mixed Views on Policies
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Americans believe that not having at-home broadband "would
be a major disadvantage to finding a job, getting health
information or accessing other key information," a nearly ten-
percent increase over the previous five years. 12
And yet, Internet access in much of America is dismal. Fifty
percent of American households have access to only one
Internet provider, with no competition to drive faster or more
affordable service, and an additional ten percent of households
(including nearly forty percent of households in rural areas)
have no access to a broadband Internet provider 13 at all. 14
America's dominant Internet Service Providers (ISPs)-such as
Comcast, AT&T and Time Warner Cable-all rank among the
country's least popular companies, 15 and with good reason: on
average, United States residents pay more money for slower
Internet than do people in most countries in the developed
world. 16
12 JOHN B. HORRIGAN & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RES. CTR., HOME BROADBAND 2015
4 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/12/Broadband-adoption-
full.pdf [http://perma.cc/AL48-ZQHG].
13 This is under the FCC's definition of broadband Internet as offering a
download speed of twenty-five megabits per second and an upload speed of
three megabits per second. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, 2016 BROADBAND
PROGRESS REPORT 3 (2016),
http://apps.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/FCC-16-6A1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/FN3B-6P2C].
14 Id. at 38 tbl.6.
15 Karl Bode, Broadband ISPs, CableCos Still Least Liked of Any US Industry,
DSLREPORTS (May 27, 2016, 9:04 PM),
http: /www. dslreports.com /shownews/Broadband-ISPs-CableCos-Still-Least-
Liked-of-Any-US-Industry- 137051 [http://perma.cc/5R3A-YERM]
(" [B]roadband ISPs and cable companies continue to have the worst customer
satisfaction ratings of any industry in the United States.").
16 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMMUNITY-BASED BROADBAND
SOLUTIONS: THE BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND CHOICE FOR COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT AND HIGH SPEED INTERNET ACCESS 10 (2015),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/community-
based broadband report by executive office of the president.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6ZE4-75EU] (noting that when twenty-four United States
and international cities were compared, "the median monthly price offered at
each Internet speed level in the U.S. was higher than international peers,
often by 50 percent or more."); see also John Aziz, Why Is American Internet
So Slow?, WEEK (Mar. 5, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/449919/why-
american-internet-slow [http://perma.cc/5LHT-JYE8] ("According to a recent
study by Ookla Speedtest, the U.S. ranks a shocking 31st in the world in
terms of average download speeds."); Hannah Yi, This Is How Internet Speed
and Price in the U.S. Compares to the Rest of the World, PBS NEWSHOUR (Apr.
26, 2015, 12:54 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/internet-u-s-
compare-globally-hint-slower-expensive [http://perma.cc/EU83-V8MA] ("Even
though the Internet was invented in the United States, Americans pay the
most in the world for broadband access. And it's not exactly blazing fast. For
an Internet connection of 25 megabits per second, New Yorkers pay about
$55-nearly double that of what residents in London, Seoul, and Bucharest,
Romania, pay. And residents in cities such as Hong Kong, Seoul, Tokyo and
Paris get connections nearly eight times faster.").
2018 316
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Although federal law requires every American be given
access to phone service, along with other services like water
and electricity, there is no such law ensuring universal access
to broadband. 17 Fully one-third of Americans do not subscribe
to at-home broadband access, and, of non-subscribers, the
overwhelming plurality cite cost as the limiting factor. 18
Because most Americans cannot count on their local
government to provide broadband service or regulate prices,
they are left with "the worst of both worlds in the broadband
industry: no competition and no regulation." 19
In response to America's lagging Internet infrastructure,
some communities and lawmakers have begun to form public
and public-private partnerships to provide Internet service as a
utility service, delivering Internet access to residents at faster
speeds and lower costs than before.20
Recent polling suggests that these efforts, or at least the
right to undertake them, enjoy overwhelming bipartisan
support. Seven in ten Americans believe local governments
should have the right to build their own broadband networks,
including approximately two-thirds of Republicans and three-
quarters of Democrats. 21 In 2015, the White House issued a
report trumpeting these publicly owned broadband networks,
describing affordable, high-speed Internet access as "critical to
U.S. economic growth and competitiveness." 22 There are a
growing number of successful publicly owned high-speed
Internet networks in communities nationwide. 23
One example of a successful publicly owned Internet
network lies in a small city in southeastern Tennessee. The city
of Chattanooga quietly launched its publicly owned high-speed
Internet network in 2010, and today its city-run Internet is
faster and more affordable at its speed than almost any other
17 See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 12 ("When the telephone was the dominant
medium of exchange, U.S. Law required that every American have access to a
phone along with other utility services such as water and electricity.").
18 HORRIGAN & DUGGAN, supra note 12, at 4.
19 CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 270.
20 See, e.g., HAROLD FELD ET AL., MEDIA ACCESS PROJECT, CONNECTING THE
PUBLIC: THE TRUTH ABOUT MUNICIPAL BROADBAND 4 (2005),
http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-legacy/mb white paper.pdf
[http://perma.cc/W3NN-8SYX] ("[Liocal communities are finding they can get
better service for less money if they do it themselves."); see also EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at 18 ("[Public broadband networks] in
places like Chattanooga, TN, and Lafayette, LA ... have Internet speeds up
to 100 times faster than the national average and deliver it at an affordable
price.").
21 See Olmstead et al., supra note 11.
22 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at 3.




Guttentag: A Light in Digital Darkness: Public Broadband after Tennessee v.
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
A Light in Digital Darkness
network in the world. 24 Upgrading Chattanooga's grid and
network cost $330 million,25 an investment that appears to be
paying off handsomely: in its first five years it brought the city
an estimated S865 million in economic and social benefits,
including thousands of new jobs.26
Given Chattanooga's success, one might expect Tennessee
and other states to seek to replicate these networks in other
cities. Depending on the community's goals, it need not even
operate or manage the network it builds. A single municipal
network could host a large number of competing ISPs, if it
finances the initial construction of the network (connecting
high-speed fiber-optic cables to homes, via its electric grid or a
similar network), and then leases those connections to
competing ISPs. 27 This model is like an airport: the community
finances the network (the airport), then leases the airport's
connections (gates) to private ISPs, who compete with each
other over providing service to customers.
24 Edward Wyatt, Fast Internet Is Chattanooga's New Locomotive, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/technology/fast-internet-
service-speeds-business-development-in-chattanooga.html
[http://perma.cc/EKP7-ZRHE] ("'Gig City,' as Chattanooga is sometimes
called, has what city officials and analysts say was the first and fastest-and
now one of the least expensive-high-speed Internet services in the United
States. For less than $70 a month, consumers enjoy an ultrahigh-speed fiber-
optic connection that transfers data at one gigabit per second. That is 50
times the average speed for homes in the rest of the country, and just as
rapid as service in Hong Kong, which has the fastest Internet in the world.").
25 Chattanooga's city-owned utility, EPB (formerly "Electric Power Board of
Chattanooga"), covered the $330 million cost in two ways: a $111 million
federal stimulus grant, and $219 million in borrowed bonds. Notably, the
savings produced from the smart grid, as well as the revenue from Internet
connections, more than cover the grid's capital and operating cost. See DAVID
TALBOT & MARIA PAZ-CANALES, MUN. FIBER PROJECT, SMART GRID PAYBACKS:
THE CHATTANOOGA EXAMPLE 1 (2017),
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/30201056/2017-02-
06 chatanooga.pdf [http://perma.cc/KMA9-DTUN] ("Data show that the
savings produced by the smart grid, plus revenue from access fees paid by the
utility's Internet access business, more than cover the capital and operating
costs of the smart grid. What's more, we estimate this would still be true even
if the utility hadn't received a $111.6 million federal stimulus grant, and
instead borrowed the extra amount.").
26 Dave Flessner, EPB Fiber Optics Gives Chattanooga a Boost, TIMES FREE
PRESS (Sept. 16, 2015),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/story/2015/sep/16
/epb-fiber-optics-gives-city-boost/325362 [http://perma.cc/38RK-683H] ("An
EPB-commissioned study by UTC's Department of Finance estimates EPB's
smart grid and fiber optic network has helped add at least 2,800 jobs and
pumped an extra $865.3 million into the local economy over the past four
years by cutting power outages, improving data connections, lowering power
bills and attracting businesses to the self-described 'Gig City."').
27 See Susan Crawford, Google Fiber Was Doomed from the Start, WIRED (Mar.
14, 2017), http://www.wired.com/2017/03/google-fiber-was-doomed-from-the-
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Instead, Tennessee and nineteen other states have made it
harder, not easier, to build local networks like the one in
Chattanooga. Those state legislatures passed laws that ban or
restrict their cities' abilities to provide community-financed
Internet service, commonly referred to as "public broadband" or
"municipal broadband." 28 The two phrases are used
interchangeably here, since "public broadband" need not be
administered by a municipality. 29
Some cities hoped that the FCC would help them overcome
these restrictions, since Congress in 1996 gave the FCC
authority to preempt state laws that restrict "any entity" from
providing broadband. However, the Supreme Court ruled in
2004 that Congress had not made it sufficiently clear that a
municipality could be an "entity" providing service, 30 effectively
barring municipalities in those states from providing
broadband. Over a decade later, the FCC tried a different way
to help cities preempt state-level restrictions on municipal
broadband, but in the August 2016 decision Tennessee v. FCC,
a federal court held that the FCC lacked the authority to do
that as well.31
These two decisions have left a number of cities that might
benefit most from municipal broadband without the means to
provide it, unless they can convince state legislatures or
Congress to overturn these restrictive state laws. Overturning
the laws would require state legislatures to buck the deep-
pocketed ISP lobbyists who pushed states to enact the
restrictions in the first place, which complicates these efforts.
In this Article, I examine the state of broadband in
America, including the lack of competition and drivers of
digital divides. I argue that broadband could be offered as a
public utility service akin to water or electricity, and make the
case that more communities should follow the lead of
28 LENNARD G. KRUGER & ANGELE A. GILROY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MUNICIPAL
BROADBAND: BACKGROUND AND POLICY DEBATE 13 (2016),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44080.pdf [http://perma.cc/X4NM-CRHH]; see also
Zaid Jilani, Killing Net Neutrality Has Brought on a New Call for Public
Broadband, INTERCEPT (Dec. 15, 2017, 5:17 PM)
http://theintercept.com/2017 /12/15/fcc-net-neutrality-public-broadband-
seattle/ [http://perma.cc/EDV4-ZBBK].
29 One reason to favor "public broadband" instead of the term "municipal
broadband" is that there is less risk that the term will lose its meaning as
referring only to networks with some form of public funding. For example, the
FCC's Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee recently used the phrase
"municipal broadband" to also refer to entirely privately owned and operated
networks, potentially confusing the term. See BROADBAND DEv. ADVISORY
COMM., FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, STATE CODE FOR ACCELERATING BROADBAND
INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT AND INVESTMENT 50 (2018),
http://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/bdac-modelcode-012018.pdf
[http://perma.cc/43YA-57E8].
30 See infra Part IV.
31 See Tennessee v. FCC, 832 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2016); infra Part V.
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Chattanooga, and others, and build their own high-speed
broadband networks. I look at how the Supreme Court's 2004
Missouri Municipal League decision emboldened ISPs to lobby
states to restrict the growth of public broadband, and revisit
Justice Stevens' lone dissent, a position which today looks
increasingly prescient. The specter of Missouri Municipal
League haunts efforts to build publicly owned broadband, and
in light of the Tennessee v. FCC decision, I argue that Missouri
Municipal League is due for review and reconsideration.
I conclude by arguing that advocates for public broadband
should engage on all fronts to lift unnecessary restrictions on
the public provision of broadband. Like electricity, broadband
has become an essential service, and no community should be
left in digital darkness.
I. THE COSTS OF LIMITING CITIES TO PRIVATE BROADBAND
"Here in Seattle, we don't rely on for-profit
companies to provide our water or electricity. The
Internet shouldn't be any different."
-Upgrade Seattle32
Like roads, broadband Internet is essential
infrastructure for the modern economy. 33 Without utility-style
regulation or public provision in areas where the private
market for broadband has failed, communities will continue to
fall behind.
Like electricity in the late nineteenth century, the
provision of Internet service today largely follows the profit
motives of private providers. 34 These profit motives disfavor
providing affordable high-speed service to less profitable poor
or rural populations when compared to denser, higher-income
neighborhoods. 35 Some scholars have argued that these market
32 See UPGRADE SEATTLE, http://www.upgradeseattle.com [http://perma.cc/YB83-
K6UA].
33 PENNY PRITZKER & TOM VILSAK, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BROADBAND OPPORTUNITY COUNCIL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2015),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/broadband opportunit
y council report final.pdf [http://perma.cc/UT6S-HZP3] ("Broadband has
steadily shifted from an optional amenity to a core utility for households,
businesses and community institutions. Today, broadband is taking its place
alongside water, sewer and electricity as essential infrastructure for
communities.").
34 See, e.g., Stricker, supra note 4, at 620 ("Broadband deployment is analogous
to the deployment of electricity in the United States in the early twentieth
century. In the 1880s, most electricity in the United States was supplied by
large, private companies that did not view extending service to less densely
populated areas as profitable or feasible and thus chose to ignore them in
favor of urban markets." (footnote omitted)).
35 The basic thinking behind this approach is that in most cases, the more
2018 320
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structures bolster the case for treating broadband Internet, at
least in areas unserved by market competition, as a utility
service akin to electricity or water. 36 Nonetheless, most
communities have not extended this logic to broadband, and
the overwhelming majority of communities rely on market
competition incentives to drive broadband deployment and
pricing. It takes just a cursory look to see why this approach
has failed.
A. The Lack of Competition in the Last Mile
The theory that a free market will deliver competition in
broadband provision is based on the idea that multiple ISPs
will compete in the "last mile" through which a broadband
connection travels. The last mile is the part of the Internet
connection with which most consumers are familiar: when a
consumer purchases Internet service from an ISP, that
consumer is purchasing a last-mile Internet connection. 37 In
other words, the last mile is "the part of the data's voyage that
takes it from local utility poles or underground tubes, into your
house, and through the cable that plugs into your [Internet
router] ." 38
customers a network serves, the more likely that network will recoup the
initial investment. It is more expensive to serve remote areas, and because
those areas are more sparsely populated, recouping the investment on the
same timeframe as a more densely populated area (ceteris paribus) would
require charging a greater monthly fee to remote residents, which could slow
the rate of broadband adoption and further hinder investment recovery.
36 See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 17 ("Utilities like water and electricity are
natural monopoly services. So is telecommunications. It costs a great deal to
set up a telecommunications system (and the U.S. government has helped
immensely along the way by handing out franchises and access to rights-of-
way to the corporate ancestors of today's giants) but very little to add one
more revenue-producing customer, and at this point competitors to
incumbent cable providers survive only by the sufferance of the local
monopolist. But Americans persist in hoping for competition to emerge.").
31 See Myles Roberts, Opening the Last Mile to Competition, 4 VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 309, 310-11 (2005) ("The Federal Communications Commission uses
a road model to describe the national communications network to those
unfamiliar with the technology. In the road model, the backbone of the
network is equivalent to a multi-lane interstate highway; the middle mile of
the network is a divided highway; the last mile is a local road; and the last
100 feet of the network is a driveway. The connection points along the
network are equivalent to the intersections, on-ramps, and interchanges of
the road system . . . . Both telecom and cable services are offered over
separate last-mile facilities. On the telecom network, the signal enters the
last mile from the middle-mile facilities at the collocation point where the
signal is separated from other signals. From the collocation point, usually a
switch located inside the carrier's central office, the signal travels ... through
the last 100 feet to the customer's premises.").
38 Adam Clark Estes, Why America's Internet Is So Shitty and Slow, GIZMODO
(Mar. 10, 2015, 3:05 PM), http://gizmodo.com/why-americas-internet-is-so-
shitty-and-slow- 1686173744 [http://perma.cc/SF8R-GHBM].
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The high cost of last-mile infrastructure is a huge
impediment for would-be market entrants and an equally large
advantage for incumbents. Nearly all the costs of broadband
provision lie in up-front capital expenditure in financing and
constructing the initial last-mile connections. 39 Once these
costs are paid, providing the service is relatively inexpensive,
and the cost of adding additional customers is low. The up-front
capital necessary to provide service deters new investment in
broadband provision and gives incumbent providers little
incentive to improve service.
Not long ago, the market for Internet service was
competitive. It was competitive because it had rules. These
regulations-the vestiges of the breakup of telephone
monopolies-kept prices low and ensured that providers would
have a chance to compete with one another. Politicians
repealed these rules, and in the process cost the country its
competitive market for Internet service. In understanding how
these repealed rules once created competitive markets, we can
better understand how to design and deploy new rules in the
future that bring those markets back.
1. The Internet's Brief Competitive Beginning
The early market for Internet service was competitive. By
1998, nine in ten Americans could choose to purchase dial-up
Internet service from seven or more ISPs, 40 a figure
unimaginable today. Today, six in ten Americans have no
choice in their broadband Internet provider: either there is only
one provider or none at all. 41 The market was competitive
because of regulation held over from the twentieth-century
breakup of "Mama Bell," a telecommunications monopoly.
When regulations were lifted, competition collapsed.
One major condition of the "Mama Bell" breakup was access
requirements, which forced incumbent telephone operators to
39 See, e.g., Stricker, supra note 4, at 596 ("Put simply, it is quite expensive to
build out a wired broadband network. The nature of wired broadband
deployment requires large up-front costs of construction, essentially capital
expenditures, as broadband connections require running wires to customers'
homes or businesses. However, once these up-front deployment costs are
paid, the network is relatively cheap to operate. Thus private ISPs price their
service above transmission costs so as to recoup their capital outlay."
(footnotes omitted)).
40 DEREK TURNER, FREEPRESS, DISMANTLING DIGITAL DEREGULATION: TOWARD A
NATIONAL BROADBAND STRATEGY 7 & n.6 (2009),
http://web.archive.org/web/20140919192630/https://www.freepress.net/sites/d
efault/files/fp-legacy/Dismantling Digital Deregulation.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M2PN-Y94X] ("Dial-up Internet went from a novelty to being
available in almost every American household. Even those in remote rural
areas had access to multiple, highly competitive Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) by the end of the [1990s].").
41 See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, supra note 13, at 38.
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lease access to their networks to competitors at reasonable
rates. New ISPs, such as AOL and Earthlink, competed by
offering "dial-up" Internet service through incumbent
telephone companies' last-mile copper telephone networks. But
the competitive market did not last long, in large part because
cable television providers did not have to follow these same
rules.
Cable television companies like Comcast, Time Warner
Cable, and so on also operated services-cable television and
telephone-in the last mile. They began offering broadband,
too, and with a big advantage over dial-up providers: their
cables could carry Internet much faster than traditional
telephone lines. Moreover, the FCC exempted these cable
companies from the "common carriage" requirements imposed
on telephone companies, 42 meaning that any ISP hoping to
compete at those speeds would have to build entirely new lines
to connect their service to homes.43
The FCC's "common carriage" access requirements on
telephone companies worked so well that the agency should
have recognized the obvious solution to cable's lack of
competition: to extend those same access requirement rules to
cable Internet providers. Instead, the George W. Bush-era FCC
did the exact opposite. It looked at the "asymmetric regulation"
between cable and telephone companies and decided to
deregulate both. It exempted both cable and telephone
companies from common-carriage rules, moving Internet
provision away from a competitive market and ushering in the
monopolistic and oligopolistic markets we see today.
The decision to deregulate telephone companies away from
common-carriage regulations effectively killed the competitive
dial-up market. 44 Telephone companies behaved as any
42 TURNER, supra note 40, at 9.
43 Few would imagine, let alone invest in, a new company coming into their city
and building a parallel competitive sewage system to compete with their
existing provider. And yet rhetoric surrounding competition in the provision
of broadband service often imagines several entrants engaging in initial
construction and duplication of a competitor's existing Internet service. See
Hannibal Travis, Wi-Fi Everywhere: Universal Broadband Access as Antitrust
and Telecommunications Policy, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1697, 1716 (2006); see also
Roberts, supra note 37, at 311 ("Just as it is cost-prohibitive to build two
roads to the same driveway, it is cost-prohibitive to build additional
communications networks along the last mile. As a result, the service
providers who control the last mile are in a position to control consumers'
service choices and the prices of those services.").
44 See TURNER, supra note 40, at 42 ("The impetus behind [FCC Chairman
Kevin Martini's desire to treat all broadband services the same was the
perceived inefficiencies and market perversions stemming from 'asymmetric
regulation.' The thinking was that since cable modem services were not
subject to Title II or Computer Inquiry regulations, then neither should any
other Internet access services, because to do so would create market
inefficiencies. Never mind the fact that it was the FCC itself that created this
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competitive business would, maximizing profit amidst the
newfound lack of price constraints. They favored their own
Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL") Internet service, and denied
access or set extremely high prices for any would-be
competitive ISPs. 45
The FCC argued at the time that deregulating all Internet
services would increase competition. 46 Instead, competition
drastically decreased. 47
Without the FCC's common-carriage regulations, AOL and
other would-be providers could no longer lease existing
networks to compete with incumbent companies, and few could
afford the costs of building new last-mile infrastructure. One
newspaper's account reflected a nationwide experience: "The
teeming ranks of ISPs offering dial-up service were replaced in
the typical residential neighborhood by a broadband duopoly
consisting of one cable operator selling cable modem service
and one telephone company selling DSL."48
The startup cost to build new networks and offer service
was even harder to justify and recoup in poorer or less densely
populated areas, so the new Internet providers that did emerge
tended to concentrate in wealthier areas already served by
broadband providers. 49 Left alone, these market forces laid the
groundwork for America's present digital divides.
B. The Major Drivers of Digital Divides
The failure to ensure universal, affordable broadband
problem in the first place via its decisions regarding cable modem service.").
45 See id. at 9.
46 See, e.g., FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, CHAIRMAN KEVIN J. MARTIN COMMENTS ON
ADOPTION OF WIRELINE BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS ORDER, 3-4 (Aug. 5,
2005), http://transition.fcc.gov/meetings/080505/sharing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FBW-22H8] ("The Order that we adopt today... ends the
regulatory inequities that currently exist between cable and telephone
companies in their provision of broadband Internet services .... I believe
that, with the actions we take today, consumers will reap the benefits of
increased Internet access competition and enjoy innovative high-speed
services at lower prices.").
47 See Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 795, 837 (2012)
("The vast majority of residents obtain Internet access from one of just two
providers in their local area: an effective duopoly in communities across the
country controlled by the local incumbent cable provider and the incumbent
telephone operator.").
48 Editorial, Keeping Consumers, Not ISPs, in Control of the Internet, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 4, 2015) http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-net-neutrality-
20151204-story.html [http://perma.cc/B2NA-ZSRK].
49 This inefficient allocation of new broadband competition towards well-served
areas is another compelling reason for why poorer and/or rural municipalities
might consider building municipal broadband networks. See Sylvain, supra
note 47, at 836 ("One of the chief and guiding reasons for municipal
broadband is the failure of private providers to deliver adequate service to
poorer and lower density areas.").
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service created "digital divides" that today leave one-third of
Americans without a subscription to at-home broadband
Internet service. 50 Like electricity providers of old, unbound
ISPs followed free market logic, serving neighborhoods that
could pay the most or were cheapest to connect. Thus, the
proportion of populations without access to broadband Internet
is highest in counties with the lowest median household
incomes, lowest population densities, highest rural population
rates, and highest poverty rates. 51
The primary factors driving digital divides are price and
supply of affordable service, not lack of demand. Among non-
broadband adopters, price sensitivity is "greatest among those
who are most likely to see the advantages of a home broadband
subscription"52-meaning that households who would likely see
benefits from broadband are priced out of service. Particularly
in poor areas and communities of color, non-subscribers would
"overwhelmingly subscribe if home access were more
affordable." 53 In other words, "[t]he adoption gap is an
affordability gap."54
In American public schools, digital divides exacerbate
educational inequities. 55 Just three percent of teachers of low-
50 HORRIGAN & DUGGAN, supra note 12, at 2.
51 FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, supra note 13, at 42 tbl.9; see also Stricker, supra
note 4, at 596 ("Internet Service Providers ('ISPs') are reluctant to enter more
remote or less populated markets .... From a business standpoint, this sort
of capital expenditure is more easily justified in densely populated areas, as
the more densely populated an area is, the more customers there are within
range of the network and available to pay for it. Consequently, major
metropolitan areas tend to have multiple private ISPs offering broadband
service, because ISPs can more quickly recover their fixed costs of
construction from the larger customer base.").
52 HORRIGAN & DUGGAN, supra note 12, at 4 ("Non-broadband adopters who view
a lack of home service as a major disadvantage are also more likely to cite the
monthly cost of broadband as the primary reason they do not subscribe.").
53 See Letter from Derek Turner, Research Dir., Free Press, et al. to Ajit Pai,
Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n et al. 4-5 (Jan. 31, 2017),
http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/legacy-
policy/free press digital divide fcc letter final.pdf [http://perma.cc/V2T2-
CCGC] ("Let us be clear: the lingering narrative that non-adopters simply do
not want to go online is dead wrong, based on usage data and survey
responses for families living in marginalized communities. As our research
shows, low-income families and people of color lacking home access have a
very high demand for it. Non-adopters in these demographic groups take
extraordinary measures to go online elsewhere, and would overwhelmingly
subscribe if home access were more affordable." (footnotes omitted)).
54 Id at 5.
55 In addition to survey data, I will state my own experience from four years as
a high school teacher at a school serving students primarily from low-income
households, from which the importance of at-home broadband access in
achieving greater educational equity became evident. Assigning research
papers that would develop online research and word processing skills
requires students to either have at-home broadband access, or else live near
enough to or have transportation to another source with broadband and a
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income students reported that all or almost all of their students
had sufficient access to digital tools they needed to complete
school assignments at home, and fifty-six percent said digital
tools are widening the gap between their most and least
successful students. 56 Seven in ten teachers report assigning
homework that requires access to broadband, 57 but "low-income
homes with children are four times more likely to be without
[at-home] broadband than their middle or upper-income
counterparts." 58 These discrepancies help explain why over
eighty percent of teachers either agree or strongly agree with
the proposition that digital tools are leading to greater
disparities between affluent and disadvantaged schools and
school districts. 59
In the context of local business development, comparing
broadband to electricity is also instructive. Communities would
struggle to attract and keep businesses if they could not offer
businesses electricity at affordable rates, since electricity has
become essential to the functioning of nearly every modern
business. Affordable, high-speed broadband has become
essential for many businesses too. If someone in a community
without affordable high-speed broadband hopes to start a web-
based business similar to Dropbox or Netflix, they almost
certainly would have to build that business somewhere else.60
computer, such as a local library. Many students in low-income households
also have other responsibilities (taking care of family, after-school jobs, and
so on) that made it especially difficult for those without at-home broadband to
complete those assignments. Without these assignments, however, the same
students are denied the opportunity to develop the skills that help prepare
them for university-level success, where Internet-based research and writing
skills are expected prerequisites.
56 KRISTEN PURCELL ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., How TEACHERS ARE USING




51 Jessica Rosenworcel, How to Close the 'Homework Gap', MIAMI HERALD (Dec.
5, 2014, 6:06 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-
ed/article4300806.html [http://perma.cc/3G3J-EZ3Y].
58 John B. Horrigan, The Numbers Behind the Broadband 'Homework Gap,'
FACT TANK (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/04/20/the-numbers -behind-the-broadband-homework-gap
("[L]owest-income households have the lowest home broadband subscription
rates. Roughly one-third (31.4%) of households whose incomes fall below
$50,000 and with children ages 6 to 17 do not have a high-speed internet
connection at home. This low-income group makes up about 40% of all
families with school-age children in the United States .... By comparison,
only 8.4% of households with annual incomes over $50,000 lack a broadband
internet connection at home.").
59 PURCELL ET AL., supra note 56, at 4. The feeling that digital tools widen
disparities is most strongly felt among teachers serving either low-income or
high-income student groups. Id. at 47.
60 See, e.g., Maria Sudekum, Google's Ultra-Fast Internet Creates 'Silicon
Prairie', PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jan. 14, 2013),
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The lack of broadband bears repeating: nearly four in ten
Americans living in rural areas, and one in ten Americans
overall, currently have no option-at any price-to subscribe to
broadband access where they live.6 1
These digital divides-most pronounced among poor and
rural communities, tribal areas, and senior citizens-represent
a challenge and an opportunity for state and local governments
hoping to bring residents and local businesses online to reap
the numerous expected educational, economic, and social
benefits of broadband access. 6 2
Many communities who are still waiting for market
competition to deliver universal, affordable broadband access
should consider whether that approach has failed. The need for
that service is urgent. To bridge these digital divides and
deliver affordable, high-speed broadband, those communities
should take a closer look at networks in cities like
Chattanooga, Tennessee, as well as the nearly one hundred
other local governments that provide public broadband.6 3
II. THE PUBLIC BROADBAND ALTERNATIVE
"I might call the right of people to own and
operate their own utility something like this: a
'birch rod' in the cupboard to be taken out and
used only when the 'child' gets beyond the point
where a mere scolding does no good."
http://www.pressherald.com/2013/01/14/googles-ultra-fast-internet-creates-
silicon-prairie/ [http://perma.cc/Z8XM-Y2PC] ("The advantage [of high-speed
Internet] for startups is simple: A fast Internet pipe makes it easier to handle
large files and eliminates buffering problems that plague online video, live
conferencing and other network-intensive tasks.").
61 FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, supra note 13, at 38 tbl.6.
62 See, e.g., Stricker, supra note 4, at 595-96 ("The benefits of high-speed
Internet to both ordinary citizens and businesses are numerous and linked
directly to broadband's greater speeds. For individuals, broadband performs
critical functions such as assisting people in finding employment and
facilitating communication and education in addition to offering great
convenience and entertainment value. Broadband also gives businesses the
ability to expand their operations globally, find more and better customers
and suppliers, streamline operations, advertise more efficiently, and recruit
employees. The result is a substantial net benefit to the community, as
communities with high-quality broadband networks are more likely to attract
and retain businesses, offer greater educational opportunities, provide
government services more efficiently, and attract tourists. Speed is key, as
slower, non-broadband Internet connections render most of these benefits
unobtainable either because of the time required to access the benefits or
because the Internet products and services cannot be transmitted to users
lacking broadband access.").
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-Franklin D. Roosevelt6 4
To be clear: I do not argue that every community should,
per se, build and manage a public broadband network.
First, the circumstances of any particular community
should drive any decision about how it chooses to spend its
funds. A community satisfied with its Internet service may
rightfully decide not to spend public money on a broadband
network.
Second, there is, of yet, no single model for a public
broadband network, so such an argument would be
insufficiently precise. 65 Some models involve full public
ownership (where local governments build, finance, and
operate the broadband network); others take the form of public-
private partnerships (these come in many varieties, including
when a local government builds the network but leases
operating rights among several firms); still others experiment
with cooperative models where every subscriber becomes a
member-owner of the cooperative that owns the network,66 and
which, like rural electric and telephone cooperatives, may
qualify for federal loans and grants from the U.S. Department
of Agriculture. 67 Beyond different network models, services
offered may also vary. Some municipalities provide phone
service; others bundle Internet with cable television, run
alongside electric grids, or extend service to nearby
municipalities as well.68
Most importantly, particular communities' needs vary from
one to the next, and it is highly unlikely that there is a single
64 Roosevelt, supra note 7.
65 The phrase "municipal broadband" can have several meanings, but all should
include at least some form of public ownership of the network. See KRUGER &
GILROY, supra note 28, at 1 ("Municipal broadband (also sometimes referred
to as 'community broadband') is a somewhat amorphous term that can signify
many different ways that a local government might participate-either
directly or indirectly-in the provision of broadband service to the local
community. Municipal broadband models can include public ownership,
public-private ownership, and a cooperative model."). But see supra note 29
(describing how a recent FCC working group's draft model code used
"municipal broadband" to refer to private networks as well, adding confusion
to the meaning of the term).
66 See, e.g., SCOTT CARLSON & CHRISTOPHER MITCHELL, INST. FOR Loc. SELF-
RELIANCE, RS FIBER: FERTILE FIELDS FOR NEW RURAL INTERNET COOPERATIVE
10 (Apr. 2016), http://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2016/05/RS-
Fiber-Report-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/HHB9-T7VJ] ("Co-ops are self-
governing, member-owned associations .... Anyone who takes services from
RS Fiber is a member of the cooperative and can vote at its annual meeting.
The co-op's structure allows the network's supporters to raise equity because
non-patron members (i.e. equity investors) can participate in its ownership.").
67 See id. at 15, 17.
68 See KRUGER & GILROY, supra note 28, at 2.
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model of broadband provision that most effectively fits all their
varied needs.6 9
For these reasons, it would make little sense to argue for
publicly owned broadband per se. Even advocates for publicly
owned electric utilities like Franklin D. Roosevelt did not favor
that model in all instances. 70 Instead, in this section I aim to:
(a) "normalize" the idea of public broadband distribution in
context alongside other utilities and city services provided by
public or nonprofit providers; (b) identify where municipalities
ill-served by private broadband providers might benefit from
some form of public broadband project; and (c) explain the
hurdles a municipality hoping to build a broadband network
may first need to overcome to do so.
A. Envisioning Public Broadband as a
Local Utility
Local governments have political, economic and social
interests in ensuring that everyone has affordable access to
necessities like water and electricity. Many cities and counties
empower publicly owned utilities to supply, manage and
deliver water and electricity services as cost-efficiently as
possible. 71 Public provision of both electricity and water
generally saves consumers money relative to provision by
private providers. 72,73 Local governments have a long history of
69 See City of Wilson, 30 FCC Red. 2408, 2410 (2015) ("The actions that
communities are taking to make certain their citizens have access to
[broadband] infrastructure are varied .... No one solution works for all
communities.").
70 See Roosevelt, supra note 7. ("I do not hold with those who advocate
Government ownership or Government operation of all utilities.").
71 Eighty-seven percent of Americans receive piped water from a publicly owned
provider. See FOOD & WATER WATCH, THE STATE OF PUBLIC WATER IN THE
UNITED STATES 4 (Feb. 2016),
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/report state of public
water.pdf [http://perma.cc/74BU-LANY].
72 See Penn, supra note 6, at 33 ("[Rlates for public power customers have
typically remained well below those of customers served by private utilities
since federal comparison statistics began to be published with the end of
World War II."); see also AM. PUB. POWER ASS'N, 2015-2016 ANNUAL
DIRECTORY & STATISTICAL REPORT 55,
http://web. archive.org/web/20160804162515/http://www.pubhcpower.org/files/
PDFs/PublicPowerCostsLessl.pdf [http://perma.cc/W6DE-X65S]
("Residential customers in IOU service territories paid average rates that
were 14 percent above those paid by customers of publicly owned systems
during 2013."). But see Jim Malewitz, Deregulated Electricity a Mixed Bag for
Consumers, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2015, 7:00 AM),
http://www.texastribune.org/2015/08/12/report-deregulated-electric-utilities-
narrowing-pr [http://perma.cc/CJ7B-LEP4].
73 A review of the 500 largest U.S. community water systems found that on
average, for-profit water utilities charged 59 percent more than large publicly
owned systems. See FOOD & WATER WATCH, supra note 71, at 7; see also
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spending tax dollars on local infrastructure to provide residents
with city services (e.g., trash removal, drinking water, sewage)
that private companies might have provided instead.7 4
Given this history, there seems like there should be little
that is new or particularly controversial about communities
providing broadband, at least relative to public provision of
other utilities. As the Congressional Research Service recently
wrote, "[m]unicipal broadband follows the tradition of
municipal utilities, which have been providing basic utilities
such as water, natural gas, and electricity for many years."75
Moreover, public broadband networks can bring
underserved communities high-speed broadband at more
affordable rates. Once networks are installed and financing
bonds are repaid, there is low marginal cost in service and
adding new subscribers. Unlike Comcast and other privately-
traded ISPs, a public broadband network need not set high
prices in order to maximize profit margins for outside
shareholders. 76 Its revenue can be reinvested in the
community: upgrading the network, paying for city services, or
subsidizing Internet access for low-income or fixed-income
residents. Whereas private providers tend to favor serving
middle- to upper-income households, 77 a public broadband
network could be deployed to meet distributional needs. Public
broadband can and has induced private providers to lower
prices 78 and increase speeds, 79 provide consumer choice,80 and
Richard G. Little & Wenonah Hauter, Are We Better Off Privatizing Water?
WALL STREET J. (Oct. 8, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10000872396390443816804578002280926253
750?mg=id-wsj [http://perma.cc/9KVW-QZP7] ("Private water providers are
businesses. They are motivated mainly by their bottom line. The pressure to
deliver high rates of return for shareholders drives them to cut corners when
they are operating under contracts, and to drive up costs when they are
operating as regulated utilities. The latter is a well-established phenomenon
known as the Averch-Johnson Effect, named for the economists who first
modeled it in the 1960s.").
74 See Travis, supra note 43, at 1795-96.
75 See KRUGER & GILROY, supra note 28, at 4.
76 See Stricker, supra note 4, at 597-98 ("The benefits of affordable broadband
access are so important to a community that making a profit should not be
the overarching goal. The main purpose of municipal broadband should be to
provide an increasingly necessary public service, not turn a profit.").
77 KRUGER & GILROY, supra note 28, at 4.
78 See, e.g., DAN MAHONEY & GREG RAFERT, ANALYSIS GRP., BROADBAND
COMPETITION HELPS TO DRIVE LOWER PRICES AND FASTER DOWNLOAD SPEEDS
FOR U.S. RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS 1 (Nov. 2016),
http: /www. analysisgroup. com/uploadedfiles/cont ent/insight s/publishing/broa
dband competition report november 2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/2XRL-XVBA]
("The presence of gigabit service in a Designated Market Area ('DMA') is
associated with a $27 per month decrease in the average monthly price of
broadband plans with speeds greater than 100 Mbps and less than 1 Gbps.
This is equal to a reduction in approximately 25 percent of the monthly
standard price.").
79 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MITCHELL, NEW RULES PROJECT, BREAKING THE
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encourage local and regional economic development. 81 For
communities already served by a municipal electric utility,
municipal broadband can be particularly efficient since
"infrastructure costs can be shared across those two services,
just as private cable companies leveraged their networks to
provide Internet service." 82
In sum, for many communities there are a number of
reasons to consider a public broadband alternative to an
inadequate broadband status quo. That said, it is also worth
considering arguments presented by public broadband
opponents.
1. Arguments against Public Broadband
Arguments against public broadband operate along a
spectrum. At the far end is a view espoused by FCC
Commissioner Michael O'Rielly: categorical opposition to any
government entity offering broadband or any other
communications services. 83 Commissioner O'Rielly's position is
BROADBAND MONOPOLY 8 (May 2010),
http://muninetworks.org/sites/www. muninetworks.org/files/breaking-bb-
monopoly.pdf [http://perma.ce/YY5Z-PJYU] ("[Plublic networks spurred
investment by the incumbents, a trend that is replayed in every community
that builds its own network .... In Colorado, Qwest and Comeast only built
broadband in Longmont after the city announced a partnership with another
company that would use public fiber to deliver broadband services. After
Lafayette began building its fiber network, incumbent cable company Cox
upgraded its offerings, noting 'the people in this area have made it very clear
they want faster speeds."'); Jon Brodkin, Comcast Brings Fiber to City that It
Sued 7 Years Ago To Stop Fiber Rollout, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 30, 2015, 6:10
PM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/04/comeast-brings-fiber-to-city-
that-it-sued-7-years-ago-to-stop-fiber-rollout [http://perma.ce/J4GE-UDCZ]
(describing Comeast's steps to match the Chattanooga Electric Power Board's
steps).
80 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at 4.
81 See, e.g., BENGT G. MOLLERYD, OECD, DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH-SPEED
NETWORKS AND THE ROLE OF MUNICIPAL NETWORKS 25 (2015), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5jrqdl7rvns3-en.pdf [http://perma.cc/E97X-
X96L] ("[Municipal broadband networks] facilitate economic growth and
development of new jobs and strengthen the competitiveness of businesses
located in their towns and regions."); see also, e.g., George S. Ford & Thomas
M. Koutsky, Broadband and Economic Development: A Municipal Case Study
from Florida, 17 REV. URB. & REGIONAL DEV. STUD. 216, 216 (2006) ("Our
econometric model shows that Lake County ... has experienced significantly
greater growth in economic activity relative to comparable Florida counties
since making its municipal fiber-optic network generally available to
businesses and municipal in the county. Our findings are consistent with
other analyses that postulate that broadband infrastructure can be a
significant contributor to economic growth.").
82 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 16, at 13.
83 See City of Wilson, 30 FCC Rcd. 2408, 2519 (2015) (O'Reilly, Comm'r,
dissenting) ("Let me start by expressing my profound opposition to the
offering of broadband or any communications service by a government entity,
in this case a municipality.").
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a radical political stance, even relative to the public opinions of
public broadband's most ardent opponents in Washington, D.C.
Unlike Commissioner O'Rielly, lawmakers and lobbyists
who consistently fight community broadband projects almost
never express per se opposition to community-owned
networks. 84 Even AT&T CEO Randall Stephenson, whose
company has expended resources lobbying against public
broadband networks across the country, 85 testified before
Congress that he believed that public broadband networks can
be a logical solution to bring connectivity to areas where
broadband is unserved.86
Commissioner O'Rielly's position matters because he sits in
the majority on the Republican-led FCC. FCC commissioners
cast crucial votes on telecommunications regulations, including
those that effectively permit or prohibit the construction of
some public broadband networks. His opposition is a major
hurdle for public broadband advocates to overcome. For
example, Commissioner O'Rielly voted to reject Chattanooga's
request for FCC preemption from Tennessee's restrictions on
municipal broadband, and explained his view as follows:
Let me start by expressing my profound
opposition to the offering of broadband or any
communications service by a government entity,
in this case a municipality .... [T]he bedrock of
American capitalism is private enterprise free
from government manipulation as a market
entrant. If there is market need, an individual
with a dream and a propensity for risk will enter
84 See, e.g., Sam Gustin, Meet Marsha Blackburn, Big Telecom s Best Friend in
Congress, MOTHERBOARD (July 6, 2014, 7:35 PM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/en us/article/meet-marsha-blackburn-big-
telecoms-best-friend-in-congress [http://perma.ce/4GBP-337X?type=image].
85 See, e.g., Sean Buckley, Comcast, AT&T Thwart Municipal Broadband
Expansion Effort in Tennessee, FIERCETELECOM (Mar. 16, 2016, 12:19 PM),
http://www.fiercetelecom.com/telecom/comcast-at-t-thwart-municipal-
broadband-expansion-effort-tennessee [http://perma.cc/CHA9-RRBG]; see also
Michael Hiltzik, Cable and Telecom Firms Score a Huge Win in Their War To
Kill Municipal Broadband, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016, 2:05
PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-cable-municipal-
broadband-20160812-snap-story.html [http://perma.cc/B37R-DBWZ].
86 See Allan Holmes, How Big Telecom Smothers City-Run Broadband, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Aug. 28, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/08/28/15404/how-big-telecom-smothers-
city-run-broadband [http://perma.cc/WDP9-9QZE] ("Most of the
telecommunications companies say they support municipal broadband, but
only for those areas that they don't serve. 'The idea of private capital
competing with taxpayer-provided capital just feels inconsistent to us with
what a free-market system looks like,' AT&T Chief Executive Officer Randall
Stephenson said at a U.S. Senate hearing in June. 'But where it's unserved,
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to provide service. It is not the government's role
to offer services instead of or in competition with
private actors.8 7
As Commissioner O'Rielly explains, his belief is that if
there is a market need, an individual will provide service. This
statement might make sense, but only as a general approach: if
a competitive market provides adequate broadband service at
affordable rates, there may be little reason for a government to
provide it instead or to compete with private actors.88 But that
instance does not justify opposition to government entities
offering broadband in all cases, including in communities
where no private actor offers broadband at all.8 9 Just as it was
not always cost-efficient to provide every community with
electricity, it may not always be cost-efficient to provide every
community with broadband. In other words, "the need for
broadband is everywhere, even if the business case is not."90 No
other FCC Commissioner joined Commissioner O'Rielly's
categorical opposition to public broadband.
This is not to say that there are no arguments against
public broadband to be made in some cases, particularly in
areas already well served by affordable broadband service. For
example, some argue against public broadband networks on the
grounds that these networks may have several unfair, market-
distorting advantages over private ISPs, such as the ability to
87 City of Wilson, 30 FCC Red. at 2519 (O'Reilly, Comm'r, dissenting) (emphasis
added).
88 Note the disclaimer "as a general approach." There is evidence that
municipalities who announce plans to or interest in building a municipal
broadband network may spur existing providers to upgrade networks and
offer faster speeds. See, e.g., Comments of the Fiber to the Home Council
Americas in Support of Electric Power Board and City of Wilson Petitions at
8-9, City of Wilson, 30 FCC Rcd. 2408 (2015) (Nos. 14-115, 14-116)
("[Miunicipal utility all-fiber systems have spurred competition and
additional network builds.").
89 This opposition can also read like a catch-22, since the municipalities most
likely to look into municipal broadband provision are likely communities
poorly served by their existing market for broadband, if such a market exists
at all. Thus, opposition to municipal broadband in all communities on the
grounds that it would compete with existing private providers opposes
municipal broadband in the very communities most likely to benefit from it.
See Carl Kandutsch, The Case for Municipal Broadband, BROADBAND
PROPERTIES MAG., May 2005, at 18, 23,
http://www.broadbandproperties.com/2005issues/may05issues/Carl Kandutsc
h The Case for Muni Broadband.pdf [http://perma.cc/P3L3-UXYF] ("[T]o
take this objection seriously, one must ignore the evidence of market failure,
which as discussed above constitutes the single greatest incentive for
municipal involvement in communications in the first place. That is, if there
were a healthy competitive market for communications services either
nationally or locally, municipalities would not be motivated to involve
themselves in the market.").
90 City of Wilson, 30 FCC Rcd. at 2410.
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grant themselves right-of-way or to clear regulatory barriers
that might be placed in the way of private providers.91 Others
argue that the public might fund networks at predatorily low
rates that undercut private sector competition. 92 Expenditures
could divert money away from more pressing needs. Perhaps
some governments are ill-equipped to build and manage
telecommunications networks relative to private sector
expertise, or the capital required for certain networks'
construction makes them a bad investment if enough city
residents do not ultimately adopt broadband service,9 3 and so
on. None of these arguments against public broadband are
inherently wrong: any community considering deploying a
broadband network should understand these concerns, as well
as whether and how they apply to the community's own
circumstances. 9
4
In any event, valid arguments against public broadband in
particular cases do not support the proposition that a network
would be a poor choice for all communities in all cases. Such
categorical opposition to public broadband seems divorced from
market reality and a rich history of public provision of essential
services, including Internet services. 95 Given the existence of
market failure in provision of broadband services in some
communities,96 the potential for public broadband networks to
91 See, e.g., Berin Szoka, Don't Blame Big Cable. It's Local Governments That




92 The opposite problem is also true: ISPs competing with municipal broadband
networks have been accused of engaging in predatory pricing, dropping their
prices below cost to deter subscribers from switching over to the publicly-
owned network. This is especially problematic for networks like
Chattanooga's, because Tennessee prohibits any government -owned network
from offering service below cost, even to low- or fixed-income residents. As a
result, Chattanooga offers its lowest-tier service for $27 per month; Comcast
responded by introducing a cheaper service (at one-tenth the speed) for a
cheaper rate of $19.99 per month. See Jason Koebler, The City That Was
Saved by the Internet, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 11, 2017, 9:30 AM),
http://motherboard.vice. com/en-us/article/chattanooga-gigabit-fiber-network
[http://perma.cc/YM46-5YR3].
93 See KRUGER & GILROY, supra note 28, at 4.
94 See, e.g., Successes and Failures, COMMUNITY NETWORKS,
http://muninetworks.org/content/successes-and-failures
[http://perma.cc/5XTG-HSX5] ("[Ojur position is not that every community
has built a flawless network or that every community should immediately
invest in fiber-to-the-home. Rather, we recognize that what is right for one
community may not be right for another. Ultimately, the community itself
must decide what is important and how to proceed. . . . All community
broadband networks are clearly not failures. The claim is absurd.").
95 See Eric Null, Municipal Broadband: History's Guide, 9 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR
INFO. Soc'y 21, 25 (2013) ("[Elmpirical data show that municipalities can be
very successful Internet providers.").
96 See generally supra Introduction & Part I.
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meet public needs, and the wide and varied models of public
broadband networks available from which to choose, at least
some communities without high-speed, affordable broadband
should consider building their own networks.
2. Which Places Could Be Well-Served by Public
Broadband
Whether a particular community should provide broadband,
and in what form, will require a careful and fact-specific
examination of a number of different factors. Here are just a
few examples of what a community should consider: its existing
broadband market prices, services and state of competition;
potential for private investment absent any public provision;
the community's goals, including its desire to close digital
divides; the feasibility of other means to spur broadband
provision and adoption such as subsidies or vouchers; the
community's access to capital and future economic growth
projections; comparisons to other municipal broadband
attempts; and so on.97
So far, communities that have built their own municipal
broadband networks are mostly small to mid-sized cities, often
in rural areas. 98 Intuitively, this should make sense: the "rural
build-out problem" makes it harder for private providers to
quickly recoup investment in less densely populated areas, so
rural areas are more likely to experience market failure,
represented by lack of broadband service. 99 Rural communities
may be best suited to eschew a failing private market and vote
in favor of a public broadband network.100 Chattanooga is still
the largest city served by a municipal broadband network,
serving just over 170,000 households. 101
91 For an example of a municipal broadband feasibility study, see Seattle's
study, which provides an example of the incredible range of factors a large
municipality might consider before adopting a municipal broadband proposal.
Columbia Telecomm. Corp., City of Seattle Fiber-to-the-Premises Feasibility
Study, CITY OF SEATTLE (June 2015),
http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Broadband/2016-
6SeattleReport-Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3MQ-D976].
98 For purposes of clarity, this paper limits the term "municipal broadband" to
networks that serve homes, and does not include, for example, the many
communities that have built public networks to provide broadband to schools,
hospitals, government buildings, and so on while leaving the provision of last-
mile Internet connection to homes entirely to the private sector.
99 See Null, supra note 95, at 23-24.
100 Notably, three in four cities that have built high-speed broadband networks
tend to vote for Republican candidates in national elections. See Chris
Mitchell, Most Municipal Networks Built in Conservative Cities, COMMUNITY
NETWORKS (Jan. 20, 2015), http://muninetworks.org/content/most-municipal-
networks-built -conservative-cities [http://perma.cc/EU8N-VHJ5].
101 Emily Badger, Why Are There No Big Cities with Municipal Broadband
Networks?, CITYLAB (Mar. 4, 2013),
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Larger urban communities should also consider building
public broadband networks, though they may have different
obstacles and considerations. First, the increased number of
households served by a large urban network means the
construction cost may be greater (though perhaps not on a per-
subscriber basis, and their revenue base may be greater too).
Second, because most urban residents have access (if not
affordable access) to at least one broadband provider,
incumbents will likely lobby against the network's
construction. In the past, incumbent providers have proved
formidable foes of public broadband networks, successfully
lobbying a great number of state and local governments to
write laws that "stifle municipal broadband in its infancy." 10 2
Another factor complicating the construction of municipal
broadband in larger cities is that the most pressing broadband
problem in many of these areas is not lack of deployment but
rather lack of adoption, driven by unaffordable pricing. In these
areas, residents may support a municipal broadband network
not because the private market failed to provide broadband,
but because the private market failed to provide broadband at
a price enough people can afford. 103
B. Public Broadband in Urban Areas
Like rural areas, urban areas should look to the wide range
of forms of public broadband networks and determine if any
would fit the municipality's particular goals. For example,
instead of becoming a publicly owned ISP like EPB in
Chattanooga, some urban areas could consider fostering a
market for competitive, high-speed networks by financing the
construction of high-speed last-mile connections and then
leasing those connections to competing ISPs.
As discussed supra, one way to analogize this type of
network is to compare it to an airport, where a city finances the
airport's construction and private airline companies pay the
city to lease space in terminals and gates. 104 Here, the city
would finance and own the last-mile network (the airport), and
http://www.citylab.com/cityfixer/2013/03/why-are-there-no-big-cities-
municipal-broadband-networks/4857 [http://perma.cc/8492-SDPW].
102 John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on Competitive
Broadband Technologies, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 85, 107 (2009).
103 Here, low-income consumers lack "access" to broadband in the same way they
may, in many states, lack "access" to health insurance: though the product
(health insurance or broadband) is offered on the market, its monthly cost
means the consumer cannot afford to purchase it. Absent subsidies or price
regulations, from the consumer's perspective the accessibility of an
unaffordable product is not meaningfully different from if the product were
not offered at all.
104 See text accompanying supra note 27.
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lease the use of those connections to private ISPs (airlines).
Susan Crawford, who has written and published extensively on
telecommunications networks, advocates a similar approach:
The only business model for fiber that will
work to produce the competition, low prices, and
world-class data transport we need-certainly in
urban areas-is to get local governments
involved in overseeing basic, street grid-like
"dark" (passive, unlit with electronics) fiber
available at a set, wholesale price to a zillion
retail providers of access and services . . . a
wholesale facility that any retail actor can use at
a reasonable, fair cost.
The result: Instead of different wires
competing side by side with one another, there
would be one great basic facility available
neutrally to every form of business. Your ISP
could use that fiber in competition with 10
others; your traffic lights could use it to govern
congestion; your energy grid could use it to
measure and regulate consumption and use of
renewables . . . . At the same time, the
government would stay out of providing and
inventing retail services itself.10 5
In addition, public investment in high-speed broadband can
help advance equity-based goals, which governments are often
better equipped to work toward than are revenue-maximizing
private firms.106 For example, the public broadband network in
Wilson, North Carolina, offers public housing residents fifty-
megabits-per-second connections for just ten dollars a month. 107
For this reason, public broadband advocates in urban areas
may emphasize the network's potential to advance equity,
alongside arguments that the network would offer better speed,
service, and prices.
In Seattle, a group of citizens named Upgrade Seattle is
"dedicated to creating a publicly-owned Municipal Broadband
utility focused on equity." 108 Their advocacy materials suggest
105 Crawford, supra note 27 (emphasis added).
106 Episode 23: Susan Crawford on Investing in Internet Infrastructure, ADAM
RUINS EVERYTHING (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.maximumfun.org/adam-ruins-
everything/adam -ruins -everything-episode-23-susan-crawford-investing-
internet -infrastruct [http://perma.ce/GR4R-9ZG7].
107 Elizabeth Woyke, How To Keep the Government from Breaking the Internet,
MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 13, 2017),
http://www.technologyreview.com/s/604054/how-to-keep-the-government-
from-breaking-the-internet [http://perma.cc/Z47T-HHD7].
108 Why Municipal Broadband?, UPGRADE SEATTLE,
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an approach that arguments for public broadband in urban
areas might take:
Seattle is Ready for Better Broadband
It's time to make the Internet a city-owned
and operated utility, just like water and
electricity.
Whether you're living in Beacon Hill, Rainier
Valley, Capitol Hill or Northgate, you deserve
equitable access to fast and affordable Internet.
Did you know that 15% of Seattle residents lack
home internet?
We can roll out affordable gigabit broadband
to everyone in Seattle by making it a public
utility
Other cities have already created their own
municipal broadband networks, like
Chattanooga, Tennessee. It is time for the City of
Seattle to do the same. 109
In 2015, Seattle's city council voted 6-2 against funding a $5
million municipal broadband pilot project, but Upgrade Seattle
remains committed to its mission. 110 That same week, Seattle's
residents voted to approve an additional $930 million property
tax to fund city transportation services. " It is at least
conceivable that Seattle residents could one day vote to fund a
municipal broadband network costing half or two-thirds that
price. 112
If larger urban areas like Seattle build successful municipal
broadband networks, then just as "in the age of electrification,
the question of municipalization may grow from a small-town
referendum to a national debate." 113 Still, most municipalities
http://www.upgradeseattle.com/what-we-do [http://perma.cc/JHU4-PTUG].
109 UPGRADE SEATTLE, http://www.upgradeseattle.com [http://perma.cc/ENX9-
83R1.
110 See Josh Cohen, "No" Vote Isn't Stopping Push for Municipal Broadband in
Seattle, NEXTCITY (Nov. 23, 2015), http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/no-vote-isnt-
stopping-push-for-municipal-broadband-in-seattle [http://perma.cc/WW6R-
Y8TR].
111 Levy to Move Seattle, SEATTLE DEP'T TRANSP.,
http://www.seattle.gov/transportation/levytomoveseattle.htm
[http://perma.cc/X4G4-3AVF.
112 See Cohen, supra note 110 ("Cost was another potential barrier that [Seattle
Chief Technology Officer Michael] Mattmiller pointed to in his rationale for
not taking on municipal broadband. The city's study found implementation
would cost between $463 and $630 million, lower than previous feasibility
studies had found, but still expensive. Nonetheless, Seattle voters have
shown a willingness to tax themselves to fund city investments and recently
passed a record $930 million transportation levy.").
113 Steven C. Carlson, A Historical, Economic, and Legal Analysis of Municipal
Ownership of the Information Highway, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTERS & TECH. L.J.
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hoping to build these networks will encounter legal and
political hurdles on the way. One of the most pressing hurdles
may be the lack of political support, and perhaps outright
opposition, from the Republican-led majority at the FCC.
C. Will President Trump's FCC Support
Public Broadband?
Before the election of President Donald Trump, the
Democrat-led FCC majority under President Barack Obama
had planted itself firmly in favor of allowing communities to
construct municipal broadband networks. 114 The FCC's support
of municipal broadband played a critical part in the efforts to
expand the municipal broadband networks in Chattanooga and
Wilson. Those municipalities relied on the FCC's permission to
preempt restrictive state laws. It is not yet clear whether the
FCC will continue its Obama-era support of municipal
broadband networks.
If Chairman Ajit Pal shifts the FCC's position on public
broadband, the decision would disproportionately impact
Americans living in rural areas, who stand to gain the most
from increased access to affordable high-speed broadband.11 5 As
outgoing FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler argued, this change
would be especially unfortunate, since these were the same
areas that by and large voted for President Trump.116
In his first remarks as FCC Chairman, Pal described
bridging digital divides as one of his "top priorities," but
expressed support only for private providers' efforts, making no
reference to the role of the public sector. 117 Chairman Pal's
1, 43 (1999).
114 See, e.g., Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman, Removing Barriers to Competitive
Community Broadband, FCC BLOG (June 10, 2014, 4:17 PM),
http://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2014/06/10/removing-barriers-
competitive-community-broadband [http://perma.cc/9EXP-2J5A].
115 Jon Brodkin, Trump Voters Need Fast Broadband and Net Neutrality Too,
Tom Wheeler Says, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 20, 2017), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2017/0 l/trump -voters -need-fast -broadband- and-net -neutrality-too-tom-
wheeler-says/ [http://perma.cc/59VM-E4ND] ("[T]wo-thirds of consumers in
America have one or fewer broadband choices .... Where are those choices
most limited? In the areas where Donald Trump got the strongest response,
in rural areas, outside of major cities. If indeed this is an administration that
is speaking for those that feel disenfranchised, that representation has to
start with saying, 'we need to make sure you have fast, fair, and open
Internet because otherwise you will not be able to connect to the 21st
century."').
116 See id.; see also Danielle Kurtzleben, Rural Voters Played a Big Part in
Helping Trump Defeat Clinton, NPR (Nov. 14, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/2016/11/14/501737150/rural-voters-played-a-big-part-in-
helping-trump-defeat-clinton [http://perma.cc/A8SG-FG6W].
117 See Remarks of Ajit Pai, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (Jan. 24, 2017),
http://apps.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-343184A1.pdf
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broadband deployment working group came under fire after the
mayor of San Jose, California publicly resigned from it, stating
in an open letter that it was apparent that the group's goal was
"to create a set of rules that will provide industry with easy
access to publicly-funded infrastructure at taxpayer-subsidized
rates, without any obligation to provide broadband access to
underserved residents." 118 The group's draft model code for
states explicitly discouraged city-owned networks, though it did
not rule them out completely.11 9
It is not yet clear where Chairman Pal stands on the issue
of public broadband. Despite Chairman Pals stated interest in
bridging digital divides, the number of successful public
broadband networks, and FCC support for municipal
broadband in the last administration, Chairman Pals "Digital
Empowerment Agenda" did not mention public broadband.120
Although Commissioner O'Rielly's categorical opposition to
public broadband is extreme, at least it is expressed. It would
be helpful for public broadband advocates and opponents alike
to know where Chairman Pal stands.
Whether or not Chairman Pal does decide to publicly
support public broadband during his tenure, communities
should be taking a close look at whether a public broadband
network would fit their needs. Building the network, however,
may require overcoming several legal hurdles.
III. OVERCOMING LEGAL BARRIERS TO PUBLIC BROADBAND





[http://perma.cc/W3DB-W8Q3] ("One of the most significant things I've seen
during my time here is that there is a digital divide in this country-between
those who can use cutting-edge communications services and those who do
not. I believe one of our core priorities going forward should be to close that
divide-to do what's necessary to help the private sector build networks, send
signals, and distribute information to American consumers .... We must
work to bring the benefits of the digital age to all Americans.")
118 Jon Brodkin, Mayor Quits FCC Committee, Says It Favors ISPs over the
Public Interest, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 25, 2018), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2018/01/fcc -broadband-committee -wants -to-restrict -publicly-owned-
networks/ [http://perma.cc/97U2-NFBB].
119 Id.
120 Ajit Pai, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, A Digital Empowerment Agenda
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://apps.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-
341210A1.pdf [http://perma.cc/W9XZ-GB27].
121 Mariam Baksh, Municipalities Dream Big on Broadband, AM. PROSPECT
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Nebraska is the only state in the country where every
single resident and business receives electricity from a
community-owned institution, 122 and electricity in Nebraska
costs fifteen percent less than the national average. 123 Despite
Nebraska's success with the public provision of electricity, the
state takes the opposite approach when it comes to broadband:
state law categorically bans local communities and public
power companies from providing broadband service. 124
Nebraska's ban is perhaps the strictest in the country, but
at least nineteen other states ban or restrict the construction or
provision of public broadband. 125 Thus, in addition to
navigating local laws and transactions governing pole sharing
or right-of-way restrictions, 126 communities hoping to build
122 Thomas M. Hanna, Community-Owned Energy: How Nebraska Became the
Only State to Bring Everyone Power from a Public Grid, YES! MAG. (Jan. 30,
2015), http://www.yesmagazine.org/commonomics/nebraskas-community-
owned-energy [http://perma.cc/F6C9-G2HG] ("In the United States, there is
one state, and only one state, where every single resident and business
receives electricity from a community-owned institution rather than a for-
profit corporation .... Nebraskans pay one of the lowest rates for electricity
in the nation and revenues are reinvested in infrastructure to ensure reliable
and cheap service for years to come.").
123 Neb. Energy Office, Annual Average Electricity Price Comparison by State,
STATE OF NEB., http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/204.htm
[http://perma.cc/B7AJ-JSKX] ("As of 2016, the statewide average electricity
price is the seventeenth-lowest rate in the country, based on the latest
federal figures. Nationally, electricity costs 13 percent more than it does in
Nebraska.").
124 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86-594 ("Agency or political subdivision of state;
limitation on power: ... an agency or political subdivision of the state that is
not a public power supplier shall not provide on a retail or wholesale basis
any broadband services, Internet services, telecommunications services, or
video services .... ."), -595 ("Public power supplier, limitation on retail
services: (1) A public power supplier shall not provide on a retail basis any
broadband services, Internet services, telecommunications services, or video
services .... "); see also id. §§ 86-575, -593.
125 See Jason Koebler, The 21 Laws States Use to Crush Broadband Competition,
MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 14, 2015, 6:16 PM),
http: /motherboard.vice. com/en us/article/the -21 -laws -states -use -to-crush-
broadband-competition [http://perma.cc/9L5T-BYH6] (listing Nebraska under
"Total Ban," the strictest category, along with five other states: Arkansas,
Missouri, Montana, Tennessee, and Virginia); see also id. ("There are three
different 'categories' of state law banning municipal broadband. There are 'If-
Then' laws, which have some requirements for municipal networks such as a
voter referendum or a requirement to give telecom companies the option to
build the network themselves, rather than restrictions (some are easier to
meet than others). Then there are 'Minefield' laws, which are written
confusingly so as to invite lawsuits from incumbent ISPs, financial burden on
a city starting a network, or other various restrictions. Finally, you've got the
outright bans. Some of these are simple, others are worded in a way that
make it seem like it'd be possible to jump through the hoops necessary to
start a network, but in practice, it's essentially impossible.").
126 Getting access to utility poles is a major barrier to entry for new ISPs,
including municipal broadband networks, as it often requires negotiating
agreements with a number of different companies, sometimes including
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public broadband networks in these states will find their efforts
stymied by state-level restrictions. That is, unless those
communities can effect changes in their states' laws or
successfully petition the FCC to preempt them. 127 Neither
approach is a sure bet.
A. State-Based Restrictions on Public
Broadband
Before allowing a city to build a broadband network, a state
may have an interest in ensuring that its cities conduct proper
feasibility studies, finance responsibly, fairly compete against
any private providers, and so on. 128 But categorically banning
public provision of broadband as a matter of principle is
difficult to justify, as well as politically unpopular. 129
One explanation for why some state legislatures enact
heavy restrictions on community broadband is that private
ISPs pressure them to. Private ISPs have a well-documented
history of lobbying for these restrictions and financially
supporting state legislators who enact them. 130
incumbent ISs with little incentive to facilitate potential competitors'
market entry. See, e.g., Susan Crawford, Blame Your Lousy Internet on Poles,
BACKCHANNEL (Aug. 31, 2016), http://backehannel.com/blame-your-lousy-
internet-on-poles- 1998a85c3ed9 [http://perma.cc/5YQ4-DV62].
127 See Comments of the Coalition for Local Internet Choice at 21, City of Wilson,
30 FCC Rcd. 2408 (2015) (Nos. 14-115, 14-116) ("While the barriers differ
from state to state, they all have a single purpose and effect-to block or
significantly delay public entities in deploying advanced communications
networks .... Unless and until these barriers are removed by federal or state
action, countless communities in the states in question will be deprived of the
advantages that communities in other states enjoy."). But see Michael
O'Rielly, Municipal Broadband: A Snapshot, FCC BLOG (Jan. 30, 2015, 3:32
PM), http://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2015/01/30/municipal-broadband-
snapshot [http://perma.cc/T46C-7P9Y] ("[Miany of the limitations or
restrictions appear to be justified practices by state governments and should
be excluded from any preemption discussion.").
128 See, e.g., Sylvain, supra note 47, at 815 ("Surely, states are imposing
restrictions in response to the vigorous lobbying of private carriers. But there
are earnest policy reasons for them as well. Any governmental meddling,
critics contend, will distort the efficient operation of the price mechanism.
Municipally supported service, they explain, has an unfair competitive
advantage over private provider service because, among other things, the
former can pass along costs to taxpayers without paying taxes or attending to
the same market pressures.").
129 Brian Fung, Most Americans Want To Let Cities Build and Sell Homegrown




130 One could write an entire article about these lobbying efforts alone.
Nonetheless, given the preponderance of states that have passed restrictions
on municipal broadband, citing to a reference in each instance would be
onerous and unnecessary. See generally Holmes, supra note 86 ("For more
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For example, from 2003 to 2004 alone, private ISPs spent
over five million dollars in lobbying fees in a successful attempt
to convince the state of Pennsylvania to adopt a de facto state
prohibition against new municipal broadband projects. 131
Similar efforts abound in states that have enacted prohibitions
or restrictions on public broadband. So long as incumbent
private ISPs are powerful special interests in state legislatures,
communities may find it difficult or unrealistic to expect to
convince their state legislatures to modify or overturn these
restrictions on community broadband. 132 They may find better
success appealing to Congress, but that is no sure bet, either.
than a decade, AT&T, Comcast, Time Warner Cable Inc., and CenturyLink
Inc. have spent millions of dollars to lobby state legislatures, influence state
elections and buy research to try to stop the spread of public Internet services
that often offer faster speeds at cheaper rates. The companies have succeeded
in getting laws passed in 20 states that ban or restrict municipalities from
offering Internet to residents.").
131 See, e.g., Associated Press, Lobbyists Try to Kill Philly Wireless Plan: State
Law Pushed by Industry Would Block City Program, NBC (Nov. 23, 2004),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6570011/ns/technology and science-
wireless/t/lobbyists -try-kill-philly-wireles s-plan/ [http://perma.cc/6LAA-R6TT]
("Philadelphia's plan to offer inexpensive wireless Internet as a municipal
service-the most ambitious yet by a major U.S. city-has collided with
commercial interests including the local phone company, Verizon
Communications, Inc. In fact, a bill on Gov. Ed Rendell's desk that could
humble Philadelphia's ambitions began 19 months ago as a proposal drafted
by lobbyists for telecommunications companies."); see also O'Loughlin, supra
note 5, at 491 ("While the public relations battle raged, Verizon and other
interested parties significantly ramped up lobbying efforts in Pennsylvania,
paying out $5,275,671 to registered lobbyists between 2003 and 2004, with
Verizon alone contributing $3,152,863. In the years preceding, Verizon had
taken pains to court the state's officials, spending almost half a million
dollars in the previous three election cycles. As a result of its efforts, and with
the help of Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell's former campaign manager,
Verizon and the state's other local phone providers convinced state
lawmakers to pass a bill that gives the incumbent carriers the power to
effectively veto telecommunications projects by municipal governments.").
132 Tennessee State Senator Todd Gardenhire (R-Chattanooga) describes AT&T
as "the most powerful lobbying organization in this state by far," and blames
the company for killing attempts to further municipal broadband efforts in
the state. See Andy Sher, AT&T Is the Villain' in Battle over Rural
Broadband Access, Gardenhire Says, TIMES FREE PRESS (Feb. 3, 2016),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2016/feb/03/tennessee-
supporters-rural-broadband-rally-state-capitol-demand-legislative-
action/348317; [http://perma.cc/5DPY-NK9F]; see also id. ("The bill has been
opposed for years by AT&T, Comcast and other providers who say it's unfair
for them to have to compete with government entities like EPB. But EPB, as
well as some lawmakers like Gardenhire, say if the free market isn't
providing the service, someone else should. 'Don't fall for the argument that
this is a free market versus government battle,' Gardenhire said. 'It is not.
AT&T is the villain here, and so are the other people and cable."').
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B. Congress and the Community
Broadband Act
In 2005, the year after Pennsylvania enacted its restriction
on public broadband networks, a bipartisan group of senators
introduced the Community Broadband Act, which would "block
states from restricting local governments' ability to provide"
broadband service. The six senators supporting the bill hailed
from both parties and from all over the country-Democrats
Frank Lautenberg (N.J.), John Kerry (Mass.), and Russ
Feingold (Wis.), as well as Republicans John McCain (Ariz.),
Lindsey Graham (S.C.), and Norm Coleman (Minn.); they were
later joined by Republicans Ted Stevens (Alaska), Olympia
Snowe (Me.), and Gordon Smith (Or.).
When Senator McCain introduced this bill on the Senate
floor, he said, "When private industry does not answer the call
because of market failures or other obstacles, it is appropriate
and even commendable, for the people acting through their
local governments to improve their lives by investing in their
own future." 133 The next year, the House of Representatives
passed a larger, bipartisan bill that incorporated the
Community Broadband Act-but the Senate never passed its
version into law.134
Over ten years later, Congress still has not passed the
Community Broadband Act. Despite bipartisan support among
the voting public, support for public broadband among national
lawmakers now appears to divide national representatives
along party lines, with Democrats generally in favor and
Republicans opposed. 135 In 2015, Senator Cory Booker
reintroduced the Community Broadband Act, with five
cosponsors (four Democrats and one Independent); 136
Representative Anna Eshoo's version in the House of
Representatives had just two cosponsors, both Democrats. 137 As
133 Brendan Sasso, How Republicans Flip-Flopped on Government-Run Internet,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/how-republicans-flip-
flopped-on-government-run-internet/456861 [http://perma.cc/2YEA-7SEE].
134 See id. ("In 2006, their bill was a few short steps away from becoming law, as
it was included as a provision in a broader overhaul of telecommunications
regulation. That larger bill, authored by Republican Rep. Joe Barton, then
chairman of Energy and Commerce, passed the House with 321 votes-
including 215 Republicans. Only eight Republicans voted against it. But
fights over net neutrality and other issues bogged the legislation down in the
Senate, and it never became law.").
135 See id.
136 Cosponsors: S.240 Community Broadband Act of 2015, CONGRESS.GOV,
http://www. congress. gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bi11240/cosponsors
[http://perma.cc/96Z8-ZXJ9]
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FCC Commissioner Mignon Clyburn observed: "What is
striking, is that the language in all of these bills is nearly
identical [to those proposed in earlier years]. The only thing
that has changed is the lack of bipartisan support." 138 The same
partisan split is not equally mirrored at local levels. 139 A recent
study found that three out of four cities with municipal
broadband networks tend to vote for Republican candidates in
national elections. 140
It is not clear whether any one reason explains why this
nonpartisan issue now divides representatives on the national
level, despite widespread support from voters both parties. 141
Barring a "wave" election bringing in a sufficient number of
national representatives willing to buck heavy lobbying
opposition from private ISPs, the prospect of an imminent
legislative solution in the form of a revived bipartisan
Community Broadband Act appears distant.
However, it is also possible that Congress already passed
legislation that would give the FCC authority to preempt state
laws restricting public broadband and would allow
communities to appeal directly to the FCC for the right to lay
their own networks. If true, then Congress may not need to
revive the Community Broadband Act at all, since the FCC
would already have the power it needs to preempt these
restrictive state laws. The source of the FCC's would-be
preemption powers are two provisions written into the
138 See City of Wilson, 30 FCC Red. 2408, 2504 (2015)
139 For example, in 2017, a bipartisan group of Virginia state representatives
mounted an unsuccessful public campaign to defeat a bill that would restrict
municipal broadband statewide. See Lisa Gonzalez, Despite Intense
Bipartisan Opposition, Virginia's Anti-Municipal Broadband HB 2108
Passes, INST. FOR Loc. SELF-RELIANCE (Feb. 8, 2017), http://ilsr.org/despite-
intense-bipartisan-opposition-virginias-anti-municipal-broadband-hb-2 108-
passes [http://perma.cc/329D-FQHS] ("At a time when everything seems
political, both Republicans and Democrats appreciate that this is not a
political issue. The bill s new language, terrible as it is, passed through the
House Labor and Commerce Committee on February 2. The vote in the
committee was close-11 supported the bill and 9 opposed it. Six Republicans
opposed the bill while two Democrats supported it. Likewise, when the bill
passed in the House yesterday, Delegates voting against passage were 13
Republicans and 11 Democrats.").
140 See Christopher Mitchell, Most Municipal Networks Built in Conservative
Cities, COMMUNITY NETWORKS (Jan. 20, 2015),
http://muninetworks.org/content/most -municipal-networks-built -
conservative-cities [http://perma.cc/AX9P-2C6C].
141 One explanation ties national Republicans' "flip-flop" on municipal
broadband to partisan animosity between Congress and the President, who
publicly advocated for municipal broadband. See Sasso, supra note 133 ("But
it's hard to ignore the most significant change since the Republicans
sponsored the municipal broadband bills a few years ago: The Obama
administration has taken a position on the issue .... [Ilnstantly ma[king]
the issue more partisan. Wheeler's push on the issue has polarized
Republicans, but it's also rallied Democrats to his side.").
345
35
Guttentag: A Light in Digital Darkness: Public Broadband after Tennessee v.
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
2018 A Light in Digital Darkness 346
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
C. FCC Regulatory Authority
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), the
nation's first major telecommunications regulatory overhaul in
over sixty years, substantially amended the 1934
Communications Act that first created the FCC.142 In passing
the 1996 Act, Congress aimed to promote competition, reduce
regulation, and encourage deployment of new
telecommunications technologies, including the Internet. 143 The
1996 Act made a great number of changes in
telecommunications law, but above all, Congress was "eager to
lift nearly all unnecessary regulatory burdens on competition
and entry into the local telecommunications market." 144
1. Preemption of State Laws Under Section 253
To lift those regulatory burdens, Congress empowered the
FCC to preempt state and local laws that posed unnecessary
barriers to market entry and competition. 145 Under the 1996
Act, the FCC could preempt any state laws that prohibited, on
a non-neutral basis, any entity from providing interstate or
142 See generally, e.g., CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33034,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND REFORM (2005),
http://digital.hbrary.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs7798/ [http://perma.cc/2LW2-
XEGH] (describing the changes brought about by 1996 Act).
143 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.),
http://library.clerk.house. gov/reference-
files/PPL 104 104 Telecommunications 1996.pdf [http://perma.cc/66F9-
4BT5].
144 Sylvain, supra note 47, at 825; see also ANGELE A. GILROY, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., 96-223 SPR, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 (P.L. 104-104): A
BRIEF OVERVIEW 1, (1998),
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc8l8ll7 /m2/1/high res d/96-
223 1998Nov02.pdf [http://perma.cc/N898-PXGN] ("The general policy
objective of the 1996 Act is to open up markets to competition by removing
unnecessary regulatory barriers.").
145 See Sylvain, supra note 47, at 825-26 ("Through Section 253(a) in particular,
legislators were keen on lifting all unnecessary state and local barriers to
competition and market entry. Sponsors of the bill, for example, prevailed
over a tiny minority of legislators who did not want to see state regulatory
authority diminished. Overwhelming majorities in both chambers evidently
had little confidence in states' ability or will to encourage competition in the
local telecommunications market. The bill to which members agreed, again,
endowed the FCC with the power to preempt state and local laws that posed
any unnecessary barriers to market entry, only making allowances for state
laws that regulate rights-of-way, impose competitively neutral requirements
on providers, protect consumers, and assure universal service. Legislators
also seemed to consider local government agencies to be among the new
market entrants that would be protected from unnecessary barriers."
(footnotes omitted)).
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intrastate telecommunications service. 146 During floor debates
over this provision, a minority of senators expressed concerns
that the FCC might overreach with its preemption power, but
ultimately the majority of senators "seemed to have even less
confidence in the states to usher in the changes necessary to
bring competition, and they successfully defended the power of
the FCC to preempt state regulations." 147 Ostensibly, this
provision-section 253-meant that the FCC could preempt
state laws that prohibited cities from providing municipal
broadband.
But the Act went further still in empowering the FCC to
free localities from burdensome state-level laws that hindered
the spread of affordable Internet access, by including another
wide-ranging grant of FCC authority.
2. Removing Barriers to Investment, Deployment,
and Competition Under Section 706
The 1996 Act also requires the FCC to encourage the
reasonable and timely deployment of "advanced
telecommunications capability" 148 to all Americans and to
report on this progress to Congress each year. 149 If the FCC
determines these goals are not met, the 1996 Act requires the
FCC to "take immediate action to accelerate deployment of
such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure
investment and by promoting competition in the
telecommunications market." 150 Whenever a state imposes
regulations that protect incumbent ISPs at the expense of
adequate investment or deployment of broadband service, this
provision-section 706-provides the FCC with authority to
"remove" state barriers, which ostensibly includes the power to
preempt state laws. 151
146 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2006) ("No State or local statute or regulation, or other
State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting
the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service.").
147 Duane McLaughlin, FCC Jurisdiction Over Local Telephone Under the 1996
Act: Fenced Off?, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2210, 2223-34 (1997). For more
information about the congressional floor debate over section 253, see id. at
2223-36.
148 "Advanced Telecommunications Capability" is defined in Section 706(c)(1) of
the Act: "The term 'advanced telecommunications capability' is defined,
without regard to any transmission media or technology, as high-speed,
switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to
originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video
telecommunications using any technology." 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1).
149 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012) ("Advanced Telecommunications
Incentives").
150 See id. § 1302(b).
151 See City of Wilson, 30 FCC Rcd. 2408, 2411-12 (2015) ("Section 706 does not
contain an exception for state laws regarding how municipalities may provide
37
Guttentag: A Light in Digital Darkness: Public Broadband after Tennessee v.
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
A Light in Digital Darkness
3. Courts Preempt FCC Preemption
For proponents of municipal broadband, both parts of the
1996 Act appear to give the FCC the power to preempt state
laws restricting municipal broadband. However, when cities
filed for FCC preemption of state laws restricting municipal
broadband-first under section 253 and later under section
706-both attempts failed. Lower courts split, but on appeal,
the highest courts that heard each case (the Supreme Court
regarding section 253 in Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League,
and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit regarding
section 706 in Tennessee v. Federal Communications
Commission) decided it was not sufficiently clear that Congress
had given the FCC preemption power over state-level
restrictions on provision of broadband by any political
subdivision of the state, including by municipalities,
municipally owned utilities, or any other public entity. 152
These two decisions left a legacy that continues to hinder
efforts to offer publicly-owned broadband service. They deserve
reconsideration-especially Missouri Municipal League, which
has been widely criticized since. 153 A number of scholars
published stern critiques of the Missouri Municipal League
reasoning, stressing, for example, its "thin analysis of
telecommunications law administration generally and the
pertinent statutory provision in particular," 154 its failure to
take into account legislative history, 155 its "conscious disregard
for the benefits of municipal broadband," 156 its departure from
established federalism doctrine, 157 and many other concerns. 158
interstate communications. Rather, section 706(a) broadly authorizes the
Commission to use 'regulating methods that remove barriers to broadband
investment,' of which preemption is undoubtedly one.").
152 See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004); Tennessee v. FCC, 832
F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2016).
153 See, e.g., infra notes 154-160.
154 Sylvain, supra note 47, at 822; see also id. ("By failing to meaningfully
consider the full scope of regulatory interventions in the regulatory field
(under the amended Communications Act and elsewhere) and the language
and purpose of the provisions at issue (Section 253 of the
Telecommunications Act), the Court failed to consider the full sweep of
resources available for determining legislative intent. For these reasons, the
Missouri Municipal League opinion presents very little insight into the status
of contemporary state restrictions on municipal broadband.").
155 See, e.g., Travis, supra note 43, at 1734 ("The legislative history of section
253(a) also provides no basis for reading its preemption of anticompetitive
state telecommunications laws as not applying to municipal utilities.").
156 Stricker, supra note 4, at 607.
157 See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local
Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1021 (2007)
("Nixon's vision of the imperatives of state control also ignores the myriad of
ways in which Congress, at times with the Court's blessing, interferes
directly with the internal structuring of state governments in a variety of
contexts. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District No. 40-1 is a
2018 348
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Taking all of these critiques together, some argue that courts
should hesitate before applying the Missouri Municipal League
precedent widely. 159
Given the private market's failure to provide affordable
high-speed broadband to all Americans since the Missouri
Municipal League decision, and the Tennessee v. FCC decision
that followed the Missouri Municipal League precedent, I
return to both cases. I argue that Missouri Municipal League
was a product of a particular political moment and a
misunderstanding of the issues at stake. The ruling strayed
from longstanding principles of statutory interpretation, and
its legacy has been the stifling of public broadband deployment
in the United States.16 0
There is reason for hope. The public outcry for net
neutrality in 2014 and again in 2017 indicates that the public
may have a greater understanding of telecommunications
regulation than it did a decade ago, as well as a greater
appetite for democratic participation in Internet rulemaking.161
With enough public pressure, Congress could pass corrective
legislation.
As a complementary approach, the FCC could try once more
stark example, but by no means the only one. As discussed, the Court has
upheld interference with state ordering of its own political subdivisions in
voting rights, the structure of state employment, and in the general scope of
state power." (footnotes omitted)).
158 See, e.g., Sylvain, supra note 47, at 818 ("The attention the Missouri
Municipal League opinion has received from legislators and commentators is
reason alone to give that opinion more than casual consideration."); id. at 818
n.131 ("The opinion has attracted the attention of able commentators for the
past seven or so years. These commentators have not directed their analysis
so much at the Court's consideration of Section 253(a), the 1996
Telecommunications Act, or communications law generally as much as the
Court's unwarranted aggrandizement of state authority over resident local
governments.").
159 See, e.g., Matthew Dunne, Note, Let My People Go (Online): The Power of the
FCC to Preempt State Laws that Prohibit Municipal Broadband, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 1126, 1157 (2007) ("More fundamentally, it may be wise to question
some of the concerns underlying [Missouri Municipal League] before applying
its precedent more widely."). Courts appear to have followed this tack: until
the Tennessee v. FCC decision that rested on Missouri Municipal League
precedent, courts distinguished or declined to extend the Missouri Municipal
League decision.
160 See, e.g., Blevins, supra note 102, at 109 ("The significance of Nixon, then, is
that the Court both upheld the legality of the states' post-1996 Act
restrictions on municipal entry, and opened the door for new legislative
restrictions.").
161 See, e.g., Elise Hu, 3.7 Million Comments Later, Here's Where Net Neutrality
Stands, NPR (Sept. 17, 2014, 3:12 PM ET),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/17 /349243335/3-7-
million-comments-later-heres-where-net -neutrality-stands the broadband
market [http://perma.cc/2CK7-U6H6] ("[A] record 3.7 million comments
arrived at the FCC . . . . [F]ewer than 1 percent were opposed to net
neutrality enforcement.").
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to grant municipalities preemption under section 253. If states
were to challenge this action in court, it would give the Court a
chance to revisit and overrule its 2004 Missouri Municipal
League decision. Even if the FCC lost in court and the Supreme
Court upheld its 2004 decision, the public effort-including
high-profile testimony on the successes of public broadband
networks and the special interest dollars that flowed to backers
of state-level restrictions on public broadband-might be
enough to move the needle for Congress.
The case for categorical bans on public broadband is so
weak that sunlight may be enough to end them entirely, or at
least to roll them back into reasonable restrictions. With
enough publicity and public pressure, Congress may be
persuaded to finally adopt the Community Broadband Act,
thereby joining the majority of Americans in expressing their
belief that local communities should have the right to build
their own networks.
IV. NIXON V. MISSOURI MUNICIPAL LEAGUE: THE Loss OF
SECTION 253
"The monopolist's tools are lawyers and local
statutes; his tactics are delays and court
challenges, all deployed with an eye toward
unraveling firms with lesser resources."
-Columbia Law Professor Tim Wu 16 2
Almost immediately after Congress adopted the 1996 Act,
incumbent telecommunications providers lobbied state
legislatures to pass laws prohibiting or severely restricting
local municipalities' abilities to provide telecommunications
services.
One prominent example of such lobbying efforts took place
in Missouri, when Southwestern Bell (later renamed "SBC")
successfully lobbied the Missouri General Assembly to adopt
HB 620. 163 The Missouri bill prohibited any "political
subdivision of the state,"16 4 including local governments, from
162 TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES
245 (2010).
163 See James Bailer, Comments of City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri
Conditionally Opposing Southwestern Bell s Application for Leave to Provide
In-Region, InterLATA Services in Missouri 1, SBC Communications, Inc., 16
FCC Rcd. 20719 (2001) (CC Docket No. 01-194), 2001 WL 1456806 (comments
filed Sept. 10, 2001), http://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/6512765204.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F5LX-LKDH].
164 See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 392.410(7) (2004) (amended 2008):
No political subdivision of this state shall provide or offer
for sale, either to the public or to a telecommunications
provider, a telecommunications service or
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offering telecommunications services. 165 In response, a
collection of Missouri municipalities, non-profit organizations,
and public power companies (collectively, "Missouri
Municipals"), on behalf of themselves and more than six
hundred Missouri municipalities and sixty-three electric
utilities, petitioned the FCC to preempt this statute. In their
filing, the Missouri Municipals asked the FCC to declare
telecommunications facility used to provide a
telecommunications service for which a certificate of service
authority is required pursuant to this section. Nothing in
this subsection shall be construed to restrict a political
subdivision from allowing the nondiscriminatory use of its
rights-of-way including its poles, conduits, ducts and similar
support structures by telecommunications providers or from
providing telecommunications services or facilities:
(1) For its own use;
(2) For 911, E-911 or other emergency services;
(3) For medical or educational purposes;
(4) To students by an educational institution; or
(5) Internet-type services.
165 Note that the law exempts political subdivisions providing "Internet-type
services" but no other telecommunications services. See id. Under the statute,
a Missouri municipality could provide broadband service, but the ability to
provide broadband service but no other services through those cables hinders
that municipality's ability to recoup its capital investment in the network.
For example, the municipal broadband networks in Chattanooga, Tennessee
and Wilson, North Carolina both offer cable television and telephone service,
since those services run through the same municipally-owned cables. Most
planned or actual municipal broadband networks also offer the "triple play of
voice, video and data," since the addition of additional services increases the
network's financial viability. See Masha Zager, Number of Community FTTP
Networks Reaches 143, BROADBANDCOMMUNITYS MAG. Aug.-Sep. 2014, at 14,
http://www.bbcmag.com/2014mags/Aug Sep/BBC Aug14 CommunityNetwor
ks.pdf [http://perma.cc/PJ4L-9QAZ]. Nonetheless, as of writing there are two
municipally owned networks in Missouri providing at-home broadband
service to a combined roughly 20,000 residents. For the first network,
Marshall Municipal Utilities in Marshall, Missouri, the Marshall Board of
Public Works owns and operates the network; for the second, liNKCity in
North Kansas, Missouri, the city contracts with a private company
(DataShack) that operates and maintains the network, which also provides
free gigabit Internet service to government facilities, churches, and schools.
See H. Trostle, Municipal FTTH Networks: Missouri, COMMUNITY NETWORKS
(Feb. 6, 2017), http://muninetworks.org/content/municipal-ftth-networks
[http://perma.cc/D4SL-VP8Q]. Several Missouri state legislators have also
attempted to advance a number of bills, including as recently as February
2017, which would add additional requirements for municipalities aiming to
provide broadband service. See Sean Buckley, Telco, Cable-backed Missouri
Bill Could Limit Municipal Broadband Growth, Opposition Group Says,
FIERCETELECOM (Feb. 15, 2017, 12:48 PM),
http://www.fiercetelecom. com/telecom/telco-cable-backed-missouri-bill-to-
limit-municipal-broadband-growth [http://perma.cc/X8TJ-B3WH]; see also,
e.g., Jon Brodkin, Municipal Broadband Could Be Restricted Yet Again, this
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Missouri's prohibition "unlawful and unenforceable" because it
violated section 253(a) of the Communications Act, fell outside
the scope of section 253(b), and thus qualified for preemption
under section 253(d). 166 The relevant text of the section 253
statute read as follows:
47 U.S.C. §253 - Removal of barriers to entry
(a) In general
No State or local statute or regulation, or
other State or local legal requirement, may
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the
ability of any entity to provide any interstate or
intrastate telecommunications service.
(b) State regulatory authority
Nothing in this section shall affect the ability
of a State to impose, on a competitively neutral
basis and consistent with section 254 of this title,
requirements necessary to preserve and advance
universal service, protect the public safety and
welfare, ensure the continued quality of
telecommunications services, and safeguard the
rights of consumers ....
(d) Preemption
If, after notice and an opportunity for public
comment, the Commission determines that a
State or local government has permitted or
imposed any statute, regulation, or legal
requirement that violates subsection (a) or (b) of
this section, the Commission shall preempt the
enforcement of such statute, regulation, or legal
requirement to the extent necessary to correct such
violation or inconsistency.1 6 7
To the Missouri Municipals, the language of section 253(a)
was clear: "No State" may prohibit "the ability of any entity to
provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications
service." Missouri's statute prohibited "any entity" (in this case,
municipally owned utilities) from providing
telecommunications service. Thus, Missouri's statute violated
section 253(a).168
The FCC denied the Missouri Municipals' petition. The
agency rejected Missouri Municipals' statutory interpretation,
Mo. Mun. League, 16 FCC Red. 1157, 1158 (2001).
47 U.S.C. § 253 (2000).
See Mo. Mun. League, 16 FCC Red. at 1161.
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and explained that "municipalities, as political subdivisions of
the state, are not 'entities' within the meaning of section
253(a)." 16 9 Following the "plain statement" rule 170 set forth in
the Supreme Court's 1991 Gregory v. Ashcroft decision, the
FCC reasoned, "a court must not construe a federal statute to
preempt traditional state powers unless Congress has made its
intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute." 171 The FCC said that it was not sufficiently clear that
Congress intended "any entity" to include publicly owned
utilities. Thus, preempting Missouri's statute would unduly
insert the FCC between a state and its political subdivisions,
an outcome not intended by section 253.172
There are at least two reasons that the FCC's denial of
Missouri Municipals' petition was odd.
First, the FCC had previously construed Congressional
telecommunications enactments as applying equally to public
and private providers, 173 and just four years earlier interpreted
"any entity" as applying to both municipally owned and for-
profit telecommunications services. 174 It was not clear why a
different principle would apply in this case. 175
Second, the FCC majority claimed it supported municipal
broadband, and three Democratic FCC appointees issued or
joined two statements accompanying their denial of Missouri
Municipals' petition. FCC Chairman Kennard and
Commissioner Tristani emphasized in their joint statement
that they voted "reluctantly" to deny the preemption petition,
given the negative outcome their decision would have for
169 Id. at 1164.
170 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to
Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control 6-7 (U. Mich.
Law Sch. Working Paper No. 99-001, 1998),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=96708
[http://perma.cc/X8B5-8MQY] ("The 'plain statement' rule in Gregory protects
federalism through the national political process by barring federal
intrusions into state sovereignty absent a clear congressional statement to
the contrary.").
171 Mo. Mun. League, 16 FCC Rcd. at 1160 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452 (1991)).
172 Id. at 1164.
173 See Travis, supra note 43, at 1728 ("Before disputes regarding municipal
provision of telecommunications services were brought to its attention, the
FCC construed the telecommunications laws in such a way that
Congressional enactments would apply equally to public and private
telecommunications providers.").
174 Id. at 1728 ("For example, in 1992, the FCC determined that the term 'any
corporation' in the 1934 Act included public telephone utilities. Similarly, in
1997, the FCC concluded that the term 'any entity' in the 1996 Act extended
to municipal telecommunications firms for purposes of their universal service
obligations.").
175 See, e.g., Dunne, supra note 159, at 1147 n.156 ("It is not clear why the FCC
was not similarly reluctant in the Abilene ruling.").
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Missouri residents. 176 The Commissioners acknowledged
members of Congress had sent them letters stating
"unequivocally" that it was Congress' intent to grant the FCC
authority to preempt state or local laws that unreasonably
restrict any entity, whether public- or privately owned, from
providing telecommunications services. 177 The Commissioners
urged Congress to "consider amending the language in section
253(a) to address clearly municipally-owned entities," 178 and
asked states to consider measures other than outright bans on
municipal broadband networks. Still, the 3-2 Democratic
majority let Missouri's restrictions stand.
Two other factors may have affected the FCC's decision:
precedent and politics.
First, the FCC had recently denied a similar petition from
the City of Abilene, Texas, on the grounds that "any entity"
was not sufficiently clear. 179 The City of Abilene appealed to
the D.C. Circuit, which upheld the FCC's decision on grounds
that it was not plain to the FCC, or the court, that
municipalities would qualify as "any entity." 180 When the FCC
denied Missouri Municipals' petition, it pointed to its denial of
Abilene's petition and the D.C. Circuit decision upholding it. 181
Second, at the time of the Missouri Municipals' petition, the
FCC had poor relations with states, and the agency was wary
of overly intruding into state affairs. 182 Two years earlier, the
Eighth Circuit had ruled that the FCC had disrupted the
balance between federal and state power and exceeded its
jurisdiction when it established pricing rules over local
telephone service. 183 As a result, the FCC facing Missouri
Municipals "may have been overly solicitous of states' rights,
and reluctant to assert its authority against the internal
political affairs of states." 184 Moreover, the agency's denial
came in the midst of the Rehnquist Court's "'revival' of
federalism," 185 a series of five-to-four cases that expanded state
sovereignty at the expense of congressional and federal court
176 Mo. Mun. League, 16 FCC Red. at 1172.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Tex., 13 FCC Red. 3460 (1997).
180 See City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
181 Mo. Mun. League, 16 FCC Red. at 1164.
182 See Carlson, supra note 113, at 58 ("Why did the FCC refuse to preempt the
Texas law in Public Utility Commission? Political considerations may have
entered into the decision. The FCC had poor relations with the states at the
time it ruled on the Texas case.").
183 See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 794 (8th Cir. 1997).
184 Carlson, supra note 113, at 58 ("The Eighth Circuit had recently criticized the
FCC for trodding on states' rights and exceeding its jurisdiction in the
deregulation of local telephony .....
185 Travis, supra note 43, at 1729.
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jurisdiction. 186 The FCC may have been reticent to preempt
state laws under section 253 for fear that the Rehnquist Court
would overrule the agency, and further weaken its regulatory
authority.
The Missouri Municipals would later face this Rehnquist
Court. But first, they appealed their case to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which sided with them and unanimously
vacated the FCC's denial of their preemption petition.
A. The Eighth Circuit Unanimously
Overturns the FCC
In a succinct, unanimous ruling barely reaching five pages,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the
FCC's denial of the Missouri Municipals' petition.
1. Section 253(a) is a "Plain Statement"; the FCC
Creates Ambiguity Where None Exists
Like the FCC, the Court of Appeals ruling focused most of
its decision on the meaning of the "any entity" language in
section 253. However, where the FCC found "any entity" to be
ambiguous as to congressional intent, the Court of Appeals
found the opposite-that the statute's meaning was clear, such
that "we should not strain to create ambiguity where none
exists." 187
Under the Gregory standard, the Court of Appeals
reasoned, "[W]e should ask a single question, is the statute's
meaning plain? If so, that ends our analysis, with the result
that it must be held that Congress has preempted state law."188
The Court of Appeals reasoned that section 253 satisfied both
the Gregory plain-statement rule and Chevron's clear-
statement rule 189: under a plain-language reading of the
186 See id. ("Starting in the 1980s, the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, orchestrated a 'revival' of federalism, or even a
,revolution' in states' rights. Specifically, the Court expanded state
sovereignty at the expense of federal constitutional rights, the powers of the
U.S. Congress, and the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In a series of five-
four decisions, the Court unshackled the states from constitutional and
Congressional limitations, in cases frequently involving the abuse of
individual rights by powerful state officials and private actors.").
181 Mo. Mun. League v. FCC, 299 F. 3d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 2002).
188 Id.
189 See id. at 951 ("We review agency determinations under the two-step process
set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). First, we must determine whether congressional intent
is clear from the plain language of the statute. If congressional intent is clear,
a contrary interpretation by an agency is not entitled to deference. If the
language of the statute is ambiguous, however, and the legislative history
reveals no clear congressional intent, we must defer to a reasonable
interpretation of the statutory provision made by the agency.")
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statute and absent further instruction from Congress, the word
"entity" would include municipalities and municipally owned
utilities.
2. The FCC Unduly Narrows the Meaning of the
Modifier "Any"
Satisfied that "entity" would encompass municipalities and
municipally owned utilities under the plain meaning of the
term, the Court of Appeals next considered the meaning of the
modifier "any." In so doing, it concluded, "Congress's use of
'any' to modify 'entity' signifies its intention to include within
the statute all things that could be considered as entities." 190
For the Court of Appeals, the "any" modifier was significant
given the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in the 1997
case Salinas v. United States, 191 which held that the term "any"
in a federal bribery statute lent itself to a broad interpretation
of Congress' statutory authority. 192 For the Court of Appeals,
Salinas's "fundamental holding" was that Congress may
"change the balance of state and federal powers when it
employs plain language to do so." 193 In Salinas, the Supreme
Court held that "by using the clearly expansive term 'any,'
Congress expressed its intent to alter this relationship." 194
Citing Salinas and other cases, the Court of Appeals concluded:
"time and time again the [Supreme] Court has held that the
modifier 'any' prohibits a narrowing construction of a
statute." 195
In sum, between the ordinary definition of "entity" and the
expansive scope of the modifier "any," the Eighth Circuit found
that municipalities would be encompassed as "any entity"
190 Id. at 953-54.
191 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
192 See Mo. Mun. League, 299 F.3d at 954 ("In Salinas v. United States, the
Court was called upon to decide whether the federal bribery statute, which
applies to 'any business transaction,' applies only to bribes affecting federal
funds. The defendant, who had bribed a state official, argued that because
the bribery statute upset the federal-state balance, the Gregory plain-
statement rule required a plain statement of congressional intent that the
bribery statute apply to bribes having no effect on federal funds. In holding
that the bribery statute included bribes of state officials, even where no
federal funds were affected, the Court stated that 'the word "any," which
prefaces the business or transaction clause, undercuts the attempt to impose
this narrowing construction.' The Court also stated that 'the plain-statement
requirement articulated in Gregory . . . does not warrant a departure from
the statute's terms."' (quoting Salinas, 522 U.S. 52)).
193 Id. at 955.
194 Id.; see also Travis, supra note 43, at 1732-33 ("Congress's insertion of the
word 'any' before 'entity' removed whatever slight doubt might have
remained, for the use of 'any' prior to a noun had been repeatedly held by the
Supreme Court to encompass all instances of the noun to which it refers.").
195 Mo. Mun. League, 299 F.3d at 954.
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under section 253(a) as well.
3. Rejecting the D.C. Circuit's Abilene Decision,
Creating the Circuit Split
The Court of Appeals also rejected the D.C. Circuit's
Abilene opinion limiting the FCC's section 253 authority. The
Court of Appeals criticized the D.C. Circuit's focus on Congress'
"tone of voice" rather than the language of the statute1 9 and
pointed out that the D.C. Circuit ruling did not even mention
Salinas, 197 an omission that "detract[ed] from the
persuasiveness of its opinion." 198 With "all due deference to our
sister circuit's holding," 199 the court held, "we do not find City of
Abilene to be persuasive."200
B. The Supreme Court Limits Section
253
Because the Eighth and D.C. Circuits split on the meaning
of section 253(a), the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2004
to resolve the conflict. The Court heard oral arguments in
January 2004 and issued its ruling two months later.
1. Majority Opinion: FCC Cannot Preempt Under
Section 253, Mostly for Prudential Reasons
In an eight-to-one opinion authored by Justice Souter
(joined in part by Justices Thomas and Scalia), the Court ruled
against the Missouri Municipals, and held that the 1996 Act
did not allow FCC to preempt state laws that restricted or
prohibited municipal telecommunications services. 20 1
The Supreme Court's decision did not rest on the "writing
on the page"202-that is to say, the plain text of section 253-
and in this regard the Court departed from both the D.C.
Circuit and Eighth Circuit holdings. Instead, the Court took a
more prudential approach, ruling that reading section 253 to
allow preemption of state laws would create "strange and
196 See id. at 955 ("We find no reference in any of the Supreme Court's decisions
regarding the word 'any' about Congress's 'tone of voice' and 'emphasis."').
197 See also Petitioners' Brief at *5, Mo. Mun. League, 299 F.3d 949 (8th Cir.
2002) (No. 01-1379), 2001 WL 34090959 ("The D.C. Circuit's failure to apply
or even mention Salinas is especially noteworthy and troubling because the
Supreme Court decided Salinas while the Abilene case was on appeal and
Abilene petitioners relied heavily on that case in their reply brief and oral
argument.").
198 Mo. Mun. League, 299 F.3d at 954.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
202 Id. at 132.
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indeterminate results" 20 3 that Congress could not have possibly
meant, and therefore Congress must not have given the FCC
this authority. The Court listed three "strange" consequences
on which it based this conclusion.
First, preemption would be ineffectual, because
"preempting a ban on government utilities would not
accomplish much if the government could not point to some law
authorizing it to run a utility in the first place." 20 4 In other
words, even if the FCC preempted a state law for a
municipality hoping to provide telecommunications service,
that municipality would still be powerless to offer
telecommunications services "in the absence of some further,
authorizing legislation."20
5
Second, preemption would create a "national crazy quilt,"
because some municipalities would be allowed to provide
telecommunications services (if explicitly authorized to do so by
their state), whereas municipalities in states next door without
such general authority could not.20 6
Third, preemption would create a "one-way ratchet": state
governments could move only towards authorizing public
provision of telecommunications service, "with no alternative to
reverse course deliberately later on."20 7 In other words, a State
could give a political subdivision ("entity") the power to
administer broadband service, but the State could not take this
power away from entities to which it had already given this
power, because the FCC could preempt such a law under
section 253.208 The Court concluded its prudential analysis:
In sum, § 253 would not work like a normal
203 See id. at 133.
204 Id. at 134.
205 Id. at 135.
206 Id. at 136 ("If the special statute were preempted, a municipality in that
State would have a real option to enter the telecommunications business if its
own legislative arm so chose and fund the venture. But in a State next door
where municipalities lacked such general authority, a local authority would
not be able to, and the result would be a national crazy quilt.").
207 Id. at 137-38.
208 Id. at 136-37 ("Assume that a State once authorized municipalities to furnish
water, electric, and communications services, but sometime after the passage
of § 253 narrowed the authorization so as to leave municipalities authorized
to enter only the water business. The repealing statute would have a
prohibitory effect on the prior ability to deliver telecommunications service
and would be subject to preemption. But that would mean that a State that
once chose to provide broad municipal authority could not reverse course. A
State next door, however, starting with a legal system devoid of any
authorization for municipal utility operation, would at the least be free to
change its own course by authorizing its municipalities to venture forth. The
result, in other words, would be the federal creation of a one-way ratchet. A
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preemptive statute if it applied to a
governmental unit. It would often accomplish
nothing, it would treat States differently
depending on the formal structures of their laws
authorizing municipalities to function, and it
would hold out no promise of a national
consistency. We think it farfetched that Congress
meant § 253 to start down such a road in the
absence of any clearer signal than the phrase
"ability of any entity."20 9
In fact, the Court did not address the issue that created the
circuit split-whether the meaning of "any entity" was
sufficiently clear-until the very last paragraph of the very last
page of its sixteen-page opinion. Here, the Court found that a
"complementary principle," the Gregory standard, would lead to
the same conclusion that Congress did not mean to give the
FCC the authority to preempt here.210 The Court held that the
language of section 253 was insufficiently clear as to whether
"any entity" included municipalities, and so the statute failed
to pass the Gregory test. The Court stated that "'ability of any
entity' is not limited to one reading, and neither statutory
structure nor legislative history points unequivocally to a
commitment by Congress to treat governmental
telecommunications providers on par with private firms." 211
Absent a more "unmistakably clear" statement, the Court
concluded that section 253 preemption did not apply to publicly
owned utilities. 212
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined only with respect to
the last paragraph of the majority opinion, and they filed a
short two-paragraph concurrence of their own.
2. Justices Scalia and Thomas's Surprising
Concurrence, on a Textual Basis
In oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia
challenged the State of Missouri's counsel, Ronald Molteni, to
explain how section 253(a)'s "any entity" language could be
clearer:
ANTONIN SCALIA: Why isn't 'any entity' clear?
... I mean what...
RONALD MOLTENI: Justice Scalia...
ANTONIN SCALIA: What do they have to say to
209 Id. at 138.
210 Id. at 140.
211 Id. at 141.
212 Id.
49
Guttentag: A Light in Digital Darkness: Public Broadband after Tennessee v.
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
A Light in Digital Darkness
make any . . . 'any entity' clear? 'Paren, and we
really mean it?' [Laughter] Or it has to say any
entity whatsoever? Would that be clear?
RONALD MOLTENI: Justice Scalia, there are no
magic words, and we're not asserting that there
are magic words that need to be there. There has
to be some terminology within the statute that..
• that demonstrates that Congress was cognizant
it intended to intrude on State government. 213
Despite his expressed incredulity during oral argument
about a narrowed interpretation of "any entity," Justice Scalia
(joined by Justice Thomas) ultimately concurred with the
majority's one-paragraph "complementary principle" that "any
entity" was insufficiently clear.214
In the concurrence, Justice Scalia joined the Court's one-
paragraph "any entity" analysis but not any other part of the
opinion, including its analysis of purported policy
consequences. Although Justice Scalia agreed that preemption
would have "several unhappy consequences," he emphasized
that his decision was on textual, not policy, grounds: "I do not
think, however, that the avoidance of unhappy consequences is
adequate basis for interpreting a text."215 The majority opinion
did not follow Justice Scalia's advice, and the structure of the
opinion (with the lion's share discussing policy consequences
and only one paragraph interpreting the text of the statute as a
"complementary" consideration) suggests a ruling based more
on policy than on statutory interpretation.216
Just two years prior to Missouri Municipal League, Justice
Scalia had described the Gregory standard as a "relatively
modest burden." 217 Nonetheless, here Justices Scalia and
Thomas argued that the last paragraph of the majority's
opinion-the "complementary consideration" paragraph
discussing the Gregory standard-was the only part of the
opinion on which they cast their vote. 218 Still, their explicit
213 Oral Argument at 14:53, Nixon, 541 U.S. 125 (2004) (Nos. 02-1238, 02-1386,
02-1405), http://www.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1238 [http://perma.cc/N7FV-
9A7M].
214 Nixon, 541 U.S. at 141 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
215 Id.
216 See Sylvain, supra note 47, at 818 ("The Court, of course, did not heed Justice
Scalia's advice. To the contrary, the question of local ability played a
significant role in the opinion.").
217 City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 450
(2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218 Nixon, 541 U.S. at 141 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Section
253(a) simply does not provide the clear statement which would be required
by Gregory v. Ashcroft for a statute to limit the power of States to restrict the
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disavowal of the Court's parade of policy consequences suggests
discomfort with the reasoning undergirding the majority
opinion-a discomfort echoed, forcefully, in Justice Stevens'
dissent.
3. Justice Stevens' Dissent: Section 253 Means What
It Says
In his solo dissent, Justice Stevens began by outlining the
common ground' among the parties" 219 in the case: that
Congress certainly intended for section 253 to apply to utilities.
To reinforce this view, Justice Stevens quoted from the
Conference Agreement on section 253, which states that
"explicit prohibitions on entry by a utility into
telecommunications are preempted under this section."220 For
Justice Stevens, the disagreement before the Court was
whether Congress could have expected that utilities would
include municipally-owned utilities. Though the petitioners
acknowledged "the unmistakable clarity of Congress' intent to
protect utilities' ability to enter local telephone markets,"
Justice Stevens observed, "they contend[ed] that Congress'
intent to protect the subset of utilities that are owned and
operated by municipalities is somehow less than clear." 221
Looking at the language of the rest of the statute, Justice
Stevens argued, this reading is highly implausible.
To Justice Stevens,
the assertion that Congress could have used the
term 'any entity' to include utilities generally,
but not municipally owned utilities, must rest on
one of two assumptions: Either Congress was
unaware that such utilities exist, or it
deliberately ignored their existence when
drafting section 253. Both propositions are
manifestly implausible .... 222
The first assumption-that Congress was unaware of the
existence of municipally owned utilities-would be an
incredible claim, given the number of such utilities operating in
the country. The second assumption-that Congress ignored
the existence of municipally owned utilities in drafting section
253-seems equally unlikely, given that the statute makes
explicit reference elsewhere to municipally owned utilities,
219 Id. at 143 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220 S. REP. No. 104-230, at 127 (1996); see Nixon, 541 U.S. at 143 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
221 Nixon, 541 U.S. at 143 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222 Id
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even as subdivisions of the State.223
Since both of these assumptions are implausible, Justice
Stevens argued, "there is every reason to suppose Congress
meant precisely what it said: No State or local law shall
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any
entity, public or private, from entering the telecommunications
market." 224 For Justice Stevens, the statute as written was
limited in scope and did not affirmatively force states to grant
new authority to their political subdivisions. 225
Justice Stevens then addressed the remaining question,
"whether reading the statute to give effect to Congress' intent
necessarily will produce the absurd results that the Court
suggests.'226 Here, Justice Stevens' dissent and Justices Scalia
and Thomas' concurrence found common ground: both agreed
that the majority's opinion unnecessarily rested on policy
determinations, rather than on principles of statutory
interpretation and precedent. For Justice Stevens, the
majority's parade of horribles was "particularly inappropriate"
given that section 253 preemption was not automatic, but
depended on an FCC determination. 227
Justice Stevens also took issue with the Court's assertion
that preemption would create a "crazy quilt" of inconsistency
among states since only some states would allow cities to
provide telecommunications services. If this were true, he
argued, permitting Missouri and other states to ban municipal
broadband would hardly help the cause of consistency. 228
Moreover, a "crazy quilt" that is the product of choices by
Congress is "no more absurd than the 'crazy quilt' that will
223 Stevens referred to the Pole Attachments Act, 47 U.S.C. § 224, which
excludes utilities "'owned by ... any State,' including its political
subdivisions-a clear indication that Congress was aware that many utilities
are in fact owned by States and their political subdivisions." Id. at 144.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 146 ("As I read the statute, the one thing a State may not do is enact a
statute or regulation specifically aimed at preventing municipalities or other
entities from providing telecommunications services.").
226 Id. at 144.
227 Id. at 147-48 ("Rather than assume that the FCC will apply the statute
improperly, and rather than stretch our imaginations to identify possible
problems in cases not before the Court, we should confront the problem
presented by the cases at hand and endorse the most reasonable
interpretation of the statute that both fulfills Congress' purpose and avoids
unnecessary infringement on state prerogatives.").
228 Id. at 146; see also Davidson, supra note 157, at 1020 ("As to the Nixon
Court's arguments from disuniformity and one-way ratchets, the Court
appears not to have considered the possibility that an entirely different (and
presumably, to Congress, more pernicious) 'crazy quilt' results from
protecting state plenary authority . . .The Court could just as easily have
drawn the exact opposite conclusion from its hypothetical-that the cause of
the disparity was not federal preemption but state control. What is missing
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result from leaving the matter of municipal entry entirely to
individual States' discretion." 229
In sum, Justice Stevens reasoned, the interpretation of
section 253 does not "turn on which side has the better view in
this policy debate. It turns on whether Congress itself intended
to take sides when it passed the 1996 Act."230 Given the plain
language of the statute and its legislative history, he
concluded, the statute granted the FCC authority to preempt
state laws that unreasonably restricted "any entity" (including
municipally owned utilities) from providing
telecommunications services.
4. The Lasting Missouri Municipal League Legacy:
Restricting Public Broadband
Just as Justice Stevens predicted, the Court's Missouri
Municipal League ruling did not prevent the "national crazy
quilt" it ostensibly aimed to avoid. Rather, it facilitated it. In
the two years following the Missouri Municipal League ruling,
ISPs launched a rush of intensive lobbying efforts that
convinced a number of state legislatures to pass restrictions on
municipal broadband. 231 Today, around twenty states have
enacted such laws, and ISPs continue to lobby for restrictive
laws in others. 232 The other thirty states do not have these
restrictions-some municipalities in those states have
municipal broadband networks, while others do not. A crazy
quilt, indeed.233
229 Nixon, 541 U.S. at 146 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230 Id. at 142.
231 See, e.g., Blevins, supra note 102, at 109 ("The significance of Nixon, then, is
that the Court both upheld the legality of the states' post-1996 Act
restrictions on municipal entry, and opened the door for new legislative
restrictions. Nixon's significance was not lost on state legislatures, nor upon
incumbent carriers. Seizing the opportunity Nixon provided, incumbent
carriers immediately launched an intensive lobbying effort in multiple states
to enact further restrictions on municipal entry into the broadband market.
Several states ultimately enacted new restrictions, while others came very
close to doing so. These restrictions came at a critical, and vulnerable, time
for municipal broadband. Indeed, at the very moment most municipal
broadband projects were being proposed and financed, Nixon had handed
incumbent carriers a potent new weapon to stifle them.").
232 See Koebler, supra note 125; see also Holmes, supra note 86.
233 Another example of the crazy quilt: In 2017, private ISPs lobbied the Virginia
state legislature to pass a bill that would ban municipal broadband
deployment in any city where a private ISP offered ten megabits per second
download speed and one megabyte per second upload speed; both speeds are
less than half of what the FCC defines as the minimum speeds to be
considered "broadband Internet". Under that bill, any Virginia city with a
single provider offering that speed could continue to languish in digital
darkness, while a nearby city without any providers at all could build a
municipal broadband network serving speeds one hundred times faster. See
Jon Brodkin, Virginia "Broadband Deployment Act" Would Kill Municipal
363
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Some have argued that the failure of more municipalities to
provide broadband service cannot be tied to the Missouri
Municipal League ruling alone, since some restrictions (e.g.,
requiring voters to approve a public network via referendum)
can and have been overcome. 234
However, even municipalities operating in states without
state restrictions face well-funded opposition. 235 Private ISPs
invest heavily in litigation and lobbying for regulatory hurdles
to prevent public broadband deployment, even in cities where
such deployment is allowed by law.236 Moreover, restrictions in
other states carry a signaling effect, telling municipalities in
restriction-free states that their efforts to create municipal
broadband "will be opposed, and thus will be more expensive to
construct." 23
7
When private ISPs lobby governments against public
broadband, their goals can include slowing public broadband
deployment, increasing its cost, or pushing a city towards
ownership models that let a private provider, not the city itself,
earn the lion's share of profits from operating the last-mile
network. For example, when Chattanooga announced its
intention to build a municipal broadband network, Comcast
filed for a declaratory injunction just hours before the city
voted on whether to upgrade its electrical grid and provide a
publicly owned broadband network. 238 Despite the lingering
threat of suit, the city approved the plans and defeated
Comcast's suit in court, including again on appeal. 239




234 See O'Rielly, supra note 127 ("Requir[ing] a referendum by individual
localities within a state seeking to offer broadband services . . .doesn't seem
to be an unreasonable or unachievable burden. For instance, a number of
Colorado localities successfully conducted the requisite referendums in
November's election. Any added costs or time would be offset by the
protections of local taxpayer funding and assurances of community support
for such networks.").
235 Efforts to municipalize electricity service often fail when faced with well-
financed utility opposition. See Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267, 344 (2017) ("Even where legal, municipalization and CCA efforts
often falter in the face of robust utility opposition."). The municipal provision
of Internet services has and will almost certainly continue to face well-
financed opposition.
236 For example, incumbent ISPs have sued cities over pole-sharing ordinances,
and fighting those suits increases the time and expense required of any new
competitor (public or private) hoping to offer service. See supra note 126.
237 Blevins, supra note 102, at 111-12 (discussing this phenomenon, called
"phantom legislation").
238 Comcast Sues EPB in Hamilton County on Eve of Bond Issue, CHATTANOOGAN
(Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.chattanoogan.com/2008/4/22/126367/Comcast-
Sues-EPB-In-Hamilton-County.aspx [http://perma.cc/8CE7-BSQS].
239 Appeals Court Upholds EPB in Lawsuit by Comcast, CHATTANOOGAN (May 13,
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For all its success, the reach of Chattanooga's municipal
broadband network-and the ability to replicate it elsewhere in
the state and elsewhere in the country-is hamstrung by the
lasting legacy of Missouri Municipal League. Over a decade
after Missouri Municipal League, the FCC-this time more
willing to flex its regulatory authority-decided to try another
way to preempt state-level municipal broadband restrictions,
this time using its section 706 authority.
V. TENNESSEE V. FCC: THE LIMITS OF SECTION 706
"[Municipal broadband] changed our conceptions
of who we are and what is possible. Before we had
never thought of ourselves as a technology city."
-Andy Berke (Mayor, Chattanooga,
TN)240
Chattanooga's success with municipal broadband had the
small city thinking big. In 2014, its municipal broadband
provider, EPB, wanted to expand its network to nearby
municipalities. Its effort was stymied by a Tennessee law that
prohibited an electric utility from providing Internet service
beyond its electric service footprint. 241 Reasoning that this
restriction was an "impermissible barrier to broadband
deployment," 242 EPB petitioned the FCC for preemption of
Tennessee's law.
The city of Wilson, North Carolina was in a similar
predicament. Wilson also deployed a municipal broadband
network, and while North Carolina permitted municipal
entities to provide broadband service, a 2011 state law
2009), http://www.chattanoogan.com/2009/5/13/151121/Appeals-Court-
Upholds-EPB-In-Lawsuit.aspx [http://perma.cc/98K4-2M2E].
240 Jamie McGee, Chattanooga Mayor: Gigabit Speed Internet Helped Revive




241 TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-52-601 (2011) ("(a) Each municipality operating an
electric plant described in § 7-52-401 has the power and is authorized within
its service area . . . to acquire, construct, own, improve, operate, lease,
maintain, sell, mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of any system, plant, or
equipment for the provision of cable service, two-way video transmission,
video programming, Internet services, or any other like system, plant, or
equipment within or without the corporate or county limits of such
municipality, and, with the consent of such other municipality, within the
corporate or county limits of any other municipality.").
242 Petition of the Electric Power Board of Chattanooga, Tennessee, Pursuant to
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, for Removal of Barriers
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effectively prohibited Wilson from expanding its network to the
five adjacent counties that comprised its electric service
territory. 243 North Carolina's state legislature enacted these
restrictions in a bipartisan vote, after incumbent ISPs-Time
Warner Cable, CenturyLink, and AT&T-spent over one
million dollars lobbying in favor of the bill, 244 and gave
campaign contributions to several of the bill's co-sponsors. 245
Because Wilson's network predated the restrictions, it was
"grandfathered" (exempted) from some of the bill's provisions,
but not all. 246 The provisions that still applied effectively
precluded Wilson from expanding its network. 247
Together, Wilson and Chattanooga petitioned the FCC for
preemption of these state restrictions, which would grant them
the right to expand their municipal broadband networks.
A. The New FCC Grants Preemption, but
Under Section 706
Chattanooga and Wilson submitted their 2014 preemption
petitions to a very different FCC, politically speaking, from the
agency that rejected Missouri Municipals' preemption petition
a decade earlier. Missouri Municipals' petition was rejected
under FCC Chairman William Kennard, a Clinton appointee
whose FCC took a "cautious approach to Internet issues" 248 and
243 See City of Wilson, 30 FCC Red. 2408, 2427 (2015).
244 See id. at 2426.
245 See David Hudnall, What's Standing Between Rural North Carolina and
Reliable Internet Service?, INDYWEEK (Nov. 9, 2016),
http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/whats-standing-between-rural-north-
carolina-and-reliable-internet-service/Content?oid=5084640
[http://perma.ce/GW8R-G3KL] ("Legislators from both sides of aisle [sic]
supported HB 129. Marilyn Avila, a Republican representing Wake County,
sponsored the bill. Campaign finance reports show that Avila has received
over $20,000 from Time Warner Cable, AT&T, and CenturyLink since 2010.
A cosponsor of HB 129, Democrat William Wainwright, received over $13,000
from those three companies before his death in 2012. Another Democratic
cosponsor, Becky Carney, has received $12,000 from AT&T, Time Warner
Cable, and CenturyLink since 2008. The fourth cosponsor, Julia Howard, a
Republican representing Forsyth, received $6,000 from those companies prior
to her vote.").
246 See Brief of Intervenor in Support of Respondents City of Wilson, Tennessee
v. FCC, 832 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-3291/3555), 2015 WL 6854344,
at *18.
247 Id.
248 Elizabeth Wasserman, Congress Doubts FCC Up to Managing Internet, CNN
(Mar. 16, 1999, 11:16 AM EST),
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9903/16/fcc.idg [http://perma.cc/3LRH-
T8C2]; see also John Simons, FCC Chief Talks a Tough Game, but Backs
Down on the Key Issues, WALL STREET J. (June 19, 1998, 11:59 PM ET),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB8981395816309000 [http://perma.cc/DED3-
63D9] (echoing this view).
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who now serves on the Board of Directors at AT&T. 249 When
President Obama appointed Tom Wheeler, a former lobbyist for
telecommunications firms, to lead the FCC, former clients
Comcast and AT&T were enthused, while consumer groups
worried he would continue to defer to incumbent ISP
interests. 250 But Wheeler did not follow his predecessors'
timidity.251
Once appointed, Wheeler "turn[ed] the FCC into a sharply
pro-consumer and pro-competition agency."252 Wheeler seemed
to relish picking fights with "the industry that he used to
represent,"253 and earned a reputation as a "Dragonslayer"254
249 See William Kennard Joins AT&T Board of Directors, AT&T NEWSROOM
(Nov. 7, 2014),
http://about.att.com/story/william kennard joins att board of directors.html
[http://perma.cc/4SNP-MFS9]. The FCC, like some other government
agencies, frequently operates with a "revolving door": regulators move from
working for the agency to working for companies the agency regulates, and
vice versa. Kennard's successor, Michael Powell (son of former Secretary of
State Colin Powell), now leads the National Cable and Telecom Association,
which spends millions of dollars each year lobbying on behalf of its clients,
including its largest client, Comcast. Some have argued the "revolving door"
often creates a conflict of interest at the agency, leading regulators to
advance industry goals over the public interest. John Dunbar, The FCCs
Rapidly Revolving Door, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 19, 2003, 12:00 AM),
http:/www.publicintegrity.org/2003/02/19/6581/fccs-rapidly-revolving-door
[http://perma.cc/83PW-HNQ5]; One particularly high-profile example of a
potential conflict of interest at the FCC came in 2011, when FCC
Commissioner Meredith Atwell Baker joined Comcast just four months after
approving its merger with NBC Universal. See Sam Gustin, Is Broadband
Internet Access a Public Utility?, TIME (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://business.time.com/2013/01/09/is-broadband-internet-access-a-public-
utility [http://perma.cc/TB8L-X5XH] ("After spending a year as a top tech
advisor to President Obama, Crawford concluded that federal policy makers
have little incentive to upset the telecom and cable giants .... This has led to
what some legal scholars call 'regulatory capture' at the Federal
Communications Commission .... ).
250 See Jon Brodkin, Uh-Oh: AT&T and Comcast are Ecstatic about the FCCs
New Chairman, ARs TECHNICA (May 1, 2013, 5:40 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/05/uh-oh-ats-new-chairman
[http://perma.cc/CUS4-S5UL].
251 One exception is FCC Commissioner Mignon Clyburn's "brief, ridiculously
productive reign" as interim FCC Chairwoman for six months in 2013. Chris
Zeigler, The Brief, Ridiculously Productive Reign of FCC Chairwoman




252 Nilay Patel, The Dragonslayer, VERGE (Mar. 9, 2016),
http://www.theverge.com/2016/3/9/11181450/fcc-chairman-tom-wheeler-
interview-5g-internet-net-neutrality [http://perma.cc/X9ZT-XZ7S].
253 Jon Brodkin, Why the Ex-Cable Lobbyist Running the FCC Turned Against
His Old Clients, ARs TECHNICA (May 1, 2013, 11:44 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/02/why-the-ex-cable-lobbyist-running-
the-fcc-turned-against-his-old-chents [http://perma.cc/X8AU-VH5J].
254 Patel, supra note 252.
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who would ensure that powerful incumbents such as Comcast,
Verizon, and AT&T followed net neutrality rules, obeyed users'
privacy, and reserved wireless spectrum for competitive
carriers. 255 In other words, Wheeler may have been the "closest
thing to a true populist the modern FCC has ever had."256
Both Wheeler and President Obama were strong public
proponents of public broadband. Both traveled to areas with
community broadband networks and promoted their potential.
In June 2014, Wheeler publicly stated that the FCC, if given
the opportunity, would "exerciseH its power to preempt state
laws that ban or restrict competition from community
broadband." 257 Less than one month later, Chattanooga and
Wilson submitted their preemption petitions to the FCC.
After evaluating the two petitions, the FCC preempted the
relevant provisions of Tennessee and North Carolina laws that
restricted broadband service, finding that preemption in these
cases would "expand broadband investment and deployment,
increase competition, and serve the public interest."258 Instead
of issuing preemption under section 253, the FCC issued it
under section 706. The latter section broadly authorized the
FCC to use "'regulating methods that remove barriers to
infrastructure investment," and where broadband is not
adequately deployed, to take "immediate action to accelerate
deployment of such capability by removing barriers to
infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the
telecommunications market."259 Because the FCC found that
255 See id. But see Karl Bode, Trump, GOP Prepare to Gut FCC Boss Tom
Wheeler's Populist Reforms . . . Under the False Banner of Populist Reform,
TECHDIRT (Nov. 18, 2016, 6:26 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/blog/netneutrality/articles/20161117/05533336066/tr
ump -gop -prepare-to-gut -fcc-boss-tom-wheelers -populist -reform sunder-fals e-
banner-populist-reform. shtml [http://perma.cc/ME6H-N4FN] ("Wheeler's
tenure floundered a bit at the tail end thanks to the agency's refusal to
seriously address zero rating, sneaky industry fees, or usage caps and
unreliable meters. Even then, most consumers will remember Wheeler fondly
as the first FCC Commissioner in the broadband era from either party that
was at least willing to actually listen to the will of the public-a public that's
sick to death of uncompetitive broadband markets caused by letting AT&T,
Verizon, and Comcast quite literally write protectionist laws that only serve
to ensure market dysfunction continues.").
256 Id. ("While the future is uncertain, one thing seems likely: Wheeler's
shortcomings on subjects like zero rating are going to seem downright
charming compared to the regulatory landscape currently being constructed
by the next administration. Tom Wheeler, the man who went from dingo to
net neutrality hero, was the closest thing to a true populist the modern FCC
has ever had.").
257 See Tom Wheeler, Removing Barriers to Competitive Community Broadband,
FCC BLOG (June 10, 2014, 4:17 PM), http://www.fcc.gov/news-
events/blog/2014/06/ 10 /removing-barriers -competitive-community-broadband
[http://perma.cc/W9T4-9LHF].
258 See City of Wilson, 30 FCC Rcd. 2408, 2413 (2015).
259 See id. at 2412 (footnotes omitted).
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broadband service was not adequately deployed, the agency
argued that it had section 706 authority to remove barriers to
infrastructure investment, including by preemption of certain
state laws.260
The FCC was careful to distinguish its preemption here
from its earlier position in Missouri Municipal League. Unlike
in Missouri Municipal League, the agency argued, the "clear
statement rule" does not apply because the FCC's action does
not alter the inherent structure of state government. Both
Wilson and Chattanooga had underlying state authorization to
construct their municipal broadband networks.26 1 Whereas in
Missouri Municipal League the Court had been concerned that
even with preemption a municipality would still be powerless
to provide telecommunications service absent express
permission from its state, the FCC explained, permission to
provide service was not at issue here. 26 2 The FCC said that its
Clinton-era decisions concerning the scope of section 253 were
not controlling here, and that the questions at issue here were
narrower in scope.26 3
Although section 253 addressed preemption, the FCC
argued, the agency is not required to act pursuant to section
253. Section 706 would suffice to serve as an alternate, "often
complementary source of authority ... [available] regardless of
whether section 253 would or would not also apply here." 26 4
Finally, the FCC argued, the Missouri Municipal League Court
had sided with the FCC's interpretation of the scope of its
regulatory authority, and courts should do the same here. Here
the FCC's "expert judgment" favored preemption under section
706, so the FCC asked for deference in granting these
preemption petitions.26 5
The FCC's decision to grant preemption to Chattanooga and
260 See id.
261 In both cases, authorization to construct municipal broadband networks is
limited in scope to specific geographic areas. Tennessee law prohibits EPB in
Chattanooga from providing telecommunications services beyond its electric
service footprint, see id. at 2443, and North Carolina law prohibits Greenlight
in Wilson from providing services outside of Wilson County, see id. at 2452.
262 See id. at 2412 ("The Nixon Court was concerned that, if Missouri's flat ban
on municipal telecommunications were preempted, 'the municipality would
still be powerless to enter the telecommunications business in the absence of
some further, authorizing legislation.' However, that is not a concern for our
interpretation of §706, which would allow preemption only in cases of
underlying authorization.").
263 See, e.g., id. at 2474 ("More fundamentally, these petitions present a
different, narrow question than did Nixon, as a comparison to the Nixon
Court's reasoning makes clear.").
264 See id. at 2476.
265 See id. at 2476-77 ("[Iun Nixon, the Court was affirming the Commission's
view. In this case, however, the Commission has reached the conclusion that
preemption is necessary . . . . [t]o the extent that this reflects the
Commission's expert judgment ... it would merit deference.").
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Wilson was not unanimous, and both Republican appointees
dissented. Commissioner O'Rielly declared the Order both
"legally infirm and bad policy."266 He criticized expanding the
FCC's section 706 authority and declared his categorical
opposition to any government entity offering broadband or any
other communications service.26 7
By contrast, then-Commissioner Pal's dissent made no
normative statement about the merits or drawbacks of
municipal broadband. Instead, in a dense dissent he termed
"Constitutional Law 101," Commissioner Pal argued that the
FCC's decision to grant preemption violated the separate
sovereignty of states guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment,
"treating Tennessee and North Carolina as mere appendages of
federal government rather than the separate sovereigns that
they are." 26 8 He argued that the Missouri Municipal League
case already decided that the FCC lacked preemption authority
under section 253.269 Moreover, under his analysis, section 706
did not delegate to the FCC any substantive authority, which
meant that the agency lacked authority under section 706 to
issue any preemption of state law whatsoever, not just in this
case. 270 If section 253 was insufficient authority to grant
preemption, Commissioner Pal argued, section 706 "falls even
further short of the mark."271
Soon after the FCC granted preemption, attorneys general
for Tennessee and North Carolina filed for judicial review of
the order, and the cases were consolidated before the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Like Commissioner Pal, the Sixth
Circuit did not believe the FCC had adequately distinguished
Missouri Municipal League. It reversed the FCC's preemption
order.
B. The Sixth Circuit Overturns The FCCs Section 706
Attempt
The Sixth Circuit's three-judge decision-with two judges in
favor and one concurring in part and dissenting in part-came
266 See id. at 2519 (O'Rielly, Comm'r, dissenting).
267 Id.
268 Id. at 2518 (Pai, Comm'r, dissenting); see id. at 2506-07 (discussing the Tenth
Amendment, dual sovereignty, and the need for "great skepticism" when
federal legislation would interfere with states' governance over their political
subdivisions, including cities).
269 See id. at 2508-09.
270 See id. at 2517 ("In short, whether one looks at the statute's text, structure,
or history, only one conclusion is possible: Congress did not delegate
substantive authority to the FCC in section 706 of the Telecommunications
Act."); see also Tennessee v. FCC, 832 F.3d 597, 608 (6th Cir. 2016)
("Commissioner Pai also contended that §706 did not grant the FCC any
preemption authority whatsoever.").
271 See City of Wilson, 30 FCC Rcd. at 2508.
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down to the question of whether the FCC had adequately
distinguished Missouri Municipal League. The judges ruled
that the FCC had not, and so Missouri Municipal League's
"clear statement" rule still applied. They reversed the FCC's
order.
The Sixth Circuit held that Missouri Municipal League was
still controlling, given the similarity between that case and the
questions at issue here.272 The Court argued that a "one-way
ratchet" similar to that described in Missouri Municipal
League could also occur here if the Court of Appeals accepted
FCC preemption under section 706: States could grant
municipalities authority to operate broadband, but would be
unable to place conditions on that service, since the FCC could
preempt those conditions under section 706.273
Given the Missouri Municipal League precedent, the Sixth
Circuit's holding was understandable, 274 and the FCC did not
appeal the ruling.275 So long as Nixon v. Missouri Municipal
League was good law and Congress had not clarified "any
entity" to mean, e.g., "any entity including public and private
and non-profit entities and political subdivisions," it was
difficult for the FCC to show it had preemption authority
distinct from that case. 276 Since in Missouri Municipal League
272 Tennessee, 832 F.3d at 611 ("The present case involves two states that
likewise have made discretionary determinations for their political
subdivisions. [Missouri Municipal League] is therefore analogous regarding
the clear statement rule and supports the rule's applicability in this case.").
273 Id. ("The FCC sought to distinguish Nixon on the ground that there is a
difference between preempting a state-law ban on municipal
telecommunications providers and preempting state laws regulating
municipal broadband providers for which the state has given an underlying
authorization. The distinction, however, does not hold up .... [A] related
anomaly, and one equally intrusive on state-municipal relations, is
presented. States can flatly prohibit municipalities from engaging in
telecommunications altogether, but they cannot do it in limited steps or with
conditions based on the governmental nature of the municipalities. This state
of affairs, in short, would be at least as anomalous a result.").
274 Cf. Karl Bode, Appeals Court Strikes Down FCC Attempt to Eliminate
Protectionist State Broadband Laws, TECHDIRT (Aug. 10, 2016, 1:04 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160810/10425135209/appeals-court-
strikes-down-fcc-attempt-to-ehminate-protectionist-state-broadband-
laws.shtml [http://perma.cc/SBX9-23YE] ("While the FCC may have been well
intentioned, all three Judges noted that the law simply doesn't give the FCC
the authority to strip out chunks of state law .... While the FCC may have
gotten too creative under the scope of the law, the end result of the ruling is
unfortunate all the same.").
275 Andy Sher, FCC Won't Appeal Sixth Circuit Court's Decision on Municipal
Broadband, GOVT TECH. (Aug. 31, 2016),
http://www. govtech.com/network/F C C-Wont-Appeal-Sixth- Circuit- Courts-
Decision-on-Municip al-Broadband.html [http://perma.cc/8BZ7-ZE54].
276 Chairman Pats preemption dissent accurately predicted the Sixth Circuit's
general reasoning. See City of Wilson, 30 FCC Rcd. at 2508 ("[If section 253
could not clear the high hurdle presented by Gregory, section 706 falls even
further short of the mark.").
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the Supreme Court determined that the statement "any entity"
was in fact insufficiently clear to justify FCC preemption under
section 253, it would have been a leap for the Sixth Circuit to
have allowed FCC preemption under section 706, which does
not reference preemption power at all. As the Sixth Circuit
held, "it can hardly be argued that section 706 is a clearer
directive than section 253; the directives in section 706-to
remove barriers and promote competition-do not make clear
whether public entities are included."277
To the FCC's credit, the Sixth Circuit's holding was a
"limited one," which did not question the "public benefits that
the FCC identifies in permitting municipalities to expand
Gigabit [broadband] Internet coverage." 278 Unfortunately, the
ruling effectively ended municipal broadband in some areas,
including in Wilson's nearby towns.
For example, before the ruling Wilson's broadband network
had connected its publicly owned network to hundreds of
households in the nearby town of Pinetops, population 1,300.
Wilson was already providing Pinetops with electricity, so the
marginal cost of providing broadband was low. 279 Its network
was a relief for Pinetops' residents, offering speeds up to
twenty-five times faster than the aging connections of Pinetops'
only broadband provider, CenturyLink DSL.28 0 After the ruling,
however, Wilson would be prohibited from offering paid
broadband service to Pinetops and a nearby family farm.281 For
six months, Wilson held out and provided Pinetops with free
broadband access, hoping North Carolina's state legislature
would repeal its public broadband restriction. 28 2 Pinetops' local
government met with North Carolina's governor and asked for
his help repealing the state law. One town commissioner,
277 Tennessee, 832 F.3d at 613.
278 Id.
279 See Greenlight Service to Pinetops, WILSON, N.C. (Mar. 27, 2017),
http://www. wilsonnc.org/communications/greenlight-service-to-pinetops
[http://perma.cc/9NMA-DLS9] ("We already had a fiber connection to the
substation serving Pinetops, so the remaining infrastructure was inexpensive
to install.").
280 Jon Brodkin, Muni ISP Forced to Shut Off Fiber-to-the-Home Internet After




281 See Cecilia Kang, Broadband Law Could Force Rural Residents Off




282 Lisa Gonzalez, Wilson To Offer Greenlight to Pinetops at No Charge,
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whose business relied on the high-speed network, pleaded: "We
just can't go back in time."28 3
After a year of uncertainty, the North Carolina legislature
granted Wilson a "temporary extension" that allowed it to use
its electric grid to keep providing fiber-optic broadband service
to Pinetops and the nearby farm. 28 4 But the bill had a major
exception: if any privately owned provider ever offers Pinetops
a similar service, Wilson must shut down its service to
Pinetops-thus giving any future provider another broadband
monopoly, with the right to charge accordingly.
VI. CONCLUSION: PUBLIC BROADBAND'S PATH AHEAD
"I'd hate to sit here and keep bashing AT&T ... I
wouldn't care if we ever made a dime on this
network, as long as it would pay for itself. If it
could increase and do the things with education,
health, safety, and economic development man,
that's a win. That's a huge win."
Larry Gates (Utilities Director,
Chanute, Kansas) 285
The Sixth Circuit's 2016 holding in Tennessee v. FCC shows
that the ghost of Missouri Municipal League still haunts the
FCC, and prevents it from being the champion of public
broadband that former Chairman Wheeler and former
President Obama had hoped it could be.
Looking ahead, proponents of public broadband could try to
build public networks where it is legal, and fight to meet or
overturn restrictions where it is not, including by pushing
lawmakers to revive and vote on the Community Broadband
Act in Congress. With every effort, they should expect heavy
resistance from well-financed ISP lobbies. More "proof-of-
concept" success stories like Chattanooga's may help move
political levers.
The new leadership at the FCC, headed by Chairman Pai,
does not bode well for the prospect that the FCC will aid cities
in deploying public broadband networks. But leadership does
283 Lisa Gonzalez, "We Just Can't Go Back in Time". Pinetops Calls for Repeal of
State Law, COMMUNITY NETWORKS (Sep. 23, 2016),
http://muninetworks.org/content/we-just-cant-go-back-time-pinetops-calls-
repeal-state-law [http://perma.c/E 5QE -P4K3].
284 Act of July 25, 2017, 2017 N.C. SESS. LAWS 180,
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2017 /Bills/House/HTML/H396v4.html
[http://perma.cc/W73C-ZWGE].
285 Colin Neagle, Inside the Tiny Kansas Town Battling Cable Lobbyists over
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change, and perhaps in a few years a "Dragonslayer" will again
head the agency and take up this cause. If she does, she should
encourage Congress to clarify the meaning of "any entity" in
section 253 to include municipally owned utilities. She could
ask Congress for an up-or-down vote on whether or not the
statute provides the FCC authority to preempt non-neutral
state laws that prohibit local governments from providing
broadband. Given the widespread bipartisan public support for
the right to offer public broadband, national attention could
help.
Even if Congress does not take a vote, a recent federal court
ruling upholding Title II reclassification of broadband service
suggests growing public recognition of the essential nature of
broadband service. 286 For this reason, the FCC may have more
success if it again uses section 253 to selectively preempt state
laws that unfairly restrict public broadband. If brought to
court, the agency could follow a different approach than it did
before the Sixth Circuit. Instead of distinguishing Missouri
Municipal League, the agency should admit it made a mistake
when it denied the Missouri Municipals' preemption petition in
2004. Given broadband's subsequent concentration into an
oligopoly of providers, and a "crazy quilt" where only some
cities can offer broadband and others cannot, the FCC should
ask the Court to join the agency in reversing the legacies its
twenty-year-old decisions have left.
Like electricity, broadband has grown from a luxury to an
essential part of public life. Like electricity, citizens should
have the right to choose to pool their resources and entrust
their local government to provide it. There are many forms of
public broadband, and cities should be able to choose the model
that best fits their needs.
When Franklin D. Roosevelt campaigned for Americans'
right to own their own electric utilities, he argued that every
big public electric project "will be forever a national yardstick
to prevent extortion against the public and to encourage the
wider use of that servant of the people- electric power."287
Publicly funded broadband networks can be the new yardstick
to prevent extortion against the public and encourage wider
286 See, e.g., Rebecca R. Ruiz & Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Approves Net Neutrality
Rules, Classifying Broadband Internet Service as a Utility, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/technology/net-neutrality-fcc-
vote-internet-utility.html [http://perma.cc/T225-7MYA] (upholding the FCC's
classification of broadband providers as "common carriers" under Title II); see
also Wu, supra note 162, at 58 ("At the heart of common carriage is the idea
that certain businesses are either so intimately connected, even essential, to
the public good, or so inherently powerful-imagine the water or electric
utilities-that they must be compelled to conduct their affairs in a
nondiscriminatory way.").
287 Roosevelt, supra note 7.
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Internet use.
So far, public broadband networks have shown that they
can deliver high-speed broadband at affordable rates. In areas
where a broadband market failed to materialize, it may be time
for communities to realize that Roosevelt's "birch rod"288 is a
better solution than waiting for the private market to improve
on its own.
Public power did not come easy. Public broadband will not
come easy, either. But as the number of successful public
networks grows, combined with widespread bipartisan public
support for these efforts, public broadband advocates have




Guttentag: A Light in Digital Darkness: Public Broadband after Tennessee v.
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
